

## Literatur zur Tugendethik

### Bibliography on Virtue Ethics

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Jörg Schroth ([jschrot@gwdg.de](mailto:jschrot@gwdg.de))

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order: <http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bvirtue.pdf>

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order: <http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/cvirtue.pdf>

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- 2011 [2] Cafaro, Philip/Sandler, Ronald (Hrsg.) (2011): *Virtue Ethics and the Environment*, Berlin, New York 2011.<sup>2</sup>
- 2011 [3] Cordell, Sean (2011): Virtuous Persons and Social Roles, *Journal of Social Philosophy* 42, S. 254–72.
- 2011 [4] Gowans, Christopher W. (2011): Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism, in *A Companion to Relativism*, hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 391–410.
- 2011 [5] Holland, Stephen (2011): The Virtue Ethics Approach to Bioethics, *Bioethics* 25, S. 192–201.
- 2011 [6] Martinez, Joel (2011): Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 89, S. 277–88.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Table of Contents: Preface. 1: Introduction. 2: Virtue, Character, and Disposition. 3: Skilled and Virtuous Action. 4: The Scope of Virtue. 5: Virtue and Enjoyment. 6: Virtues and the Unity of Virtue. 7: Virtue and Goodness. 8: Living Happily. 9: Living Virtuously, Living Happily. 10: Conclusion.

<sup>2</sup> Editorial, Richard P. Haynes. – Environmental Virtue Ethics Special Issue: Introduction, Philip Cafaro. – Environmentalism and Public Virtue, Brian Treanor. – Forgiveness, Pessimism, and Environmental Citizenship, Kathryn J. Norlock. – Radical Hope for Living Well in a Warmer World, Allen Thompson. – Species Extinction and the Vice for Learning Virtue of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises, Jeremy Bendik-Keymer. – The Virtue of Simplicity, Joshua Colt Gambrel and Philip Cafaro. – The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue, Jason Kawall. – Hume’s Knave and Nonanthropocentric Virtues, Paul Haught. – Heideggerian Environmental Virtue Ethics, Christine Swanton. – Ethical Theory and the Problem of Inconsequentialism: Why Environmental Ethicists Should be Virtue-Oriented Ethicists, Ronald Sandler. – Patriotism as an Environmental Virtue, Philip Cafaro.  
Previously published in the *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 23 (2010).

<sup>3</sup> “Virtue ethicists argue that modern ethical theories aim to give direct guidance about particular situations at the cost of offering artificial or narrow accounts of ethics. In contrast, virtue ethical theories guide action indirectly by helping one understand the virtues – but the theory will not provide answers as to what to do in particular instances. Recently, this had led many to think that virtue ethical theories are self-effacing the way some claim consequentialist and deontological theories are. In this paper I defend virtue ethics against the charge of self-effacement. I distinguish between modestly self-effacing theories, immodestly self-effacing theories and theories that recommend indirect guidance. Though all self-effacing theories are indirect, not all indirect theories are self-effacing. I argue that virtue ethics is not self-effacing, but rather indirectly action-guiding. The response I articulate draws on the distinctive virtue ethical mode of action-

- 2011 [7] van Zyl, Liezl (2011): Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent, *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28, S. 80–92.<sup>4</sup>
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- 2010 [10] Adams, Robert Merrihew (2010): A Theory of Virtue: Response to Critics, *Philosophical Studies* 148, S. 159–65. – Zu [20], [23].
- 2010 [11] Axtell, Guy (2010): Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 73–94.<sup>6</sup>
- 2010 [12] Baehr, Jason (2010): Epistemic Malevolence, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 189–213.<sup>7</sup>

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guidance: namely, that thinking hard about virtue and what kind of person one aims to be offers the kind of guidance we want (or should want) as we face practical moral problems.”

<sup>4</sup> “According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse’s account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue- and vice-rules (v-rules) for action guidance.”

<sup>5</sup> Introduction. 1. Moral Realism and Virtue Ethics. 2. A Sketch of an Aristotelian Science of Ethics. 3. How Are Ethical Principles Known? 4. Some Challenges to the Deductive Model. Appendix: Can Unconditional Moral Principles be Justified?

<sup>6</sup> “In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the “generality problem” for virtue epistemologies and the “global trait problem” for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. Beyond the aporia of character-trait ascription and between the Scylla and Charybdis that virtue theories are faced with in each field of philosophy, we find our passage by making full and explicit use of the “narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription,” and by accounting for the various uses of it in an inquiry-pragmatist account. In virtue theories informed by inquiry pragmatism, the agential habits and abilities deemed salient in explanations/evaluations of agents in particular cases, and the determination of the relevant domains and conditions that an agent’s habit or ability is reliably efficacious in, is determined by pragmatic concerns related to our evaluative epistemic practices.”

<sup>7</sup> “Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice – that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper – has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of “epistemic malevolence” makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue that there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence and offer an account of its basic character and structure. Doing so requires a good deal of attention to malevolence simpliciter. In the final section of the essay, I offer an explanation of our relative unfamiliarity with this trait.”

- 2010 [13] Bailey, Olivia (2010): What Knowledge is Necessary for Virtue?, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 4 (2), S. 1–17.<sup>8</sup>
- 2010 [14] Battaly, Heather (2010): Introduction: Virtue and Vice, *Metaphilosophy* 41 (Special Issue: Virtue And Vice, Moral And Epistemic), S. 1–21.<sup>9</sup>
- 2010 [15] Battaly, Heather (2010): Epistemic Self-Indulgence, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 214–34.<sup>10</sup>
- 2010 [16] Brady, Michael S. (2010): Virtue, Emotion, and Attention, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 115–31.<sup>11</sup>
- 2010 [17] Clarke, Bridget (2010): Virtue and Disagreement, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 13, S.

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<sup>8</sup> “Critics contend that Aristotelianism demands too much of the virtuous person in the way of knowledge to be credible. This general charge is usually directed against either of two of Aristotelianism’s apparent claims about the necessary conditions for the possession of a single virtue, namely that 1) one must know what all the other virtues require, and 2) one must also be the master of a preternatural range of technical/empirical knowledge. I argue that Aristotelianism does indeed have a very high standard when it comes to the knowledge necessary for the full possession of a virtue, in both of these respects. However, focus on the necessary conditions for full virtue tends to obscure an important fact: some kinds of knowledge are much more important to various virtues than others are. A proper appreciation of the significance of this fact will go a long way toward answering critics’ worries about Aristotelianism’s knowledge requirements.”

<sup>9</sup> “This introduction to the collection *Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic* addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.”

<sup>10</sup> “I argue in this essay that there is an epistemic analogue of moral self-indulgence. Section 1 analyzes Aristotle’s notion of moral temperance, and its corresponding vices of self-indulgence and insensibility. Section 2 uses Aristotle’s notion of moral self-indulgence as a model for epistemic self-indulgence. I argue that one is epistemically self-indulgent only if one either: (ESI1) desires, consumes, and enjoys appropriate and inappropriate epistemic objects; or (ESI2) desires, consumes, and enjoys epistemic objects at appropriate and inappropriate times; or (ESI3) desires and enjoys epistemic objects too frequently, or to an inappropriately high degree, or consumes too much of them. We need not look far to locate the epistemically self-indulgent: philosophers, especially skeptics, are likely candidates.”

<sup>11</sup> “The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.”

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- 2010 [20] Doris, John M. (2010): Heated Agreement: Lack of Character as Being for the Good, *Philosophical Studies* 148, S. 135–46. – Zu [103]. Dazu: [10].
- 2010 [21] Hacker-Wright, John (2010): Virtue Ethics without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and Contemporary Virtue Ethics, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 44, S. 209–24.
- 2010 [22] Hurka, Thomas (2010): Right Act, Virtuous Motive, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 58–72.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> “One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive – and compelling – account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle’s ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closely, first elucidating the features of the Aristotelian account that motivate it, and then identifying two further features of the account that the criticism overlooks. These further features show the criticism to be entirely unwarranted. Once these features are acknowledged, a more promising line of criticism suggests itself – namely, that the Aristotelian account does too little to help us to resolve disputes – but that line of objection will have to be carried out on quite different grounds.”

<sup>13</sup> “By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato’s and Posidonius’s respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue.”

<sup>14</sup> “The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists – virtue epistemologists in particular – have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the “impure” views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how that doctrine can provide a framework for an account of epistemic virtue. The conclusion of the essay is that a virtue epistemology based on analogies with virtue ethics, though well worth developing and considering, will face several challenges in fulfilling the significant promises that have been made on its behalf.”

<sup>15</sup> “The concepts of virtue and right action are closely connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This essay outlines a rival explanation, based on the “higher-level” account of virtue defended in the author’s *Virtue, Vice, and Value*. On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a

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- 2010 [25] Ransome, William (2010): Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Self-Undermining?, *Ethical Perspectives* 17, S. 41–57.<sup>16</sup>
- 2010 [26] Stangl, Rebecca (2010): Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism, *Ethics* 121, S. 37–57.<sup>17</sup>
- 2010 [27] Stohr, Karen E. (2010): Teaching & Learning Guide for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics, *Philosophy Compass* 5, S. 102–7.
- 2010 [28] Svensson, Frans (2010): Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 13, S. 255–71.<sup>18</sup>
- 2010 [29] Swanton, Christine (2010): A Challenge to Intellectual Virtue from Moral Virtue: The Case of Universal Love, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 152–71.<sup>19</sup>

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correlation between A and B based not on either’s causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause.”

<sup>16</sup> “Agent-based virtue ethics strives to offer a viable account of both moral conduct and the source of moral value, independent of ‘deontic’ teleological and deontological characterizations. One of its chief proponents offers an agent-based virtue-ethical account that aspires to derive all moral value, including the moral status of actions, solely from the ‘aretaic’ concept of benevolence. I suggest that morality as benevolence fails to offer a viable account of either virtuous moral conduct or the source of moral value, because it is selfundermining in both respects. In order to solve this structural problem, it appears as if the theory may have to give up its agent-based status.”

<sup>17</sup> “In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is vicious in some respect Y, then Y is always a wrong-making feature of any action whatever that has Y.”

<sup>18</sup> “Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate.”

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- 2010 [32] Verbeek, Bruno (2010): Rational Choice Virtues, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 13, S. 541–59.<sup>20</sup>
- 2010 [33] Zagzebski, Linda (2010): Exemplarist Virtue Theory, *Metaphilosophy* 41, S. 41–57.<sup>21</sup>
- 2009 [34] Audi, Robert (2009): Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action, *Philosophical Issues* 19, S. 1–20.
- 2009 [35] Badhwar, Neera K. (2009): The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 257–89.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> “On the Aristotelian picture of virtue, moral virtue has at its core intellectual virtue. An interesting challenge for this orthodoxy is provided by the case of universal love and its associated virtues, such as the dispositions to exhibit grace, or to forgive, where appropriate. It is difficult to find a property in the object of such love, in virtue of which grace, for example, ought to be bestowed. Perhaps, then, love in general, including universal love, is not necessarily exhibited for reasons. This is the view that, with the help of Heidegger’s notion of a fundamental emotional attunement (*Grundstimmung*), I defend. The problem is to show how universal love, and its manifestation in the virtues of universal love, can then be seen as rational. Showing this is the task of the essay.”

<sup>20</sup> “In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness.”

<sup>21</sup> “In this essay I outline a radical kind of virtue theory I call exemplarism, which is foundational in structure but which is grounded in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which anchors all the moral concepts in the theory. I compare several different kinds of moral theory by the way they relate the concepts of the good, a right act, and a virtue. In the theory I propose, these concepts, along with the concepts of a duty and of a good life, are defined by reference to exemplars, identified directly through the emotion of admiration, not through a description. It is an advantage of the theory that what makes a good person good is not given a priori but is determined by empirical investigation. The same point applies to what good persons do and what states of affairs they aim at. The theory gives an important place to empirical investigation and narratives about exemplars analogous to the scientific investigation of natural kinds in the theory of direct reference.”

<sup>22</sup> “The Milgram and other situationist experiments support the real-life evidence that most of us are highly akratic and heteronomous, and that Aristotelian virtue is not global. Indeed, like global theoretical knowledge, global virtue is psychologically impossible because it requires too much of finite human beings with finite powers in a finite life; virtue can only be domain-specific. But unlike local, situation-specific virtues, domain-specific virtues entail some general understanding of what matters in life, and are connected conceptually and causally to our traits in other domains. The experiments also make us aware of how easily unobtrusive situational factors can tap our susceptibilities to obedience, conformity, irresponsibility, cruelty, or indifference to others’ welfare, thereby empowering us to change ourselves for

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- 2009 [37] Chappell, Timothy (2009): *Ethics and Experience. Life Beyond Moral Theory*, Montreal, S. 97–124 (“Virtue Ethics”).
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- 2009 [41] Eylon, Yuval (2009): Virtue and Continenence, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 12, S. 137–51.<sup>26</sup>

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the better. Thus, they advance the Socratic project of living the examined life. I note a remarkable parallel between the results of the baseline Milgram experiments and the results of the learned helplessness experiments by Martin Seligman et al. This provides fresh insight into the psychology and character of the obedient Milgram subjects, and I use this insight to argue that pusillanimity, as Aristotle conceives of it, is part of a complete explanation of the behavior of the obedient Milgram subjects.”

<sup>23</sup> “Aristotelian virtue ethics invests emotions and feelings with much moral significance. However, the moral and other conflicts that inevitably beset human life often give rise to states of emotional division and ambivalence with problematic implications for any understanding of virtue as complete psychic unity of character and conduct. For one thing, any admission that the virtuous are prey to conflicting passions and desires may seem to threaten the crucial virtue ethical distinction between the virtuous and the continent. One recent attempt to sustain this distinction – considered in this paper – maintains that the contrary-to-virtue emotions and desires of the virtuous (by contrast with those of the continent) must relinquish their motive power as reasons for action. Following some attention to the psychological status of feelings and emotions – in particular their complex relations with cognition and reason – this paper rejects this solution in favour of a more constructive view of emotional conflict.”

<sup>24</sup> “In her book *Uneasy Virtue*, Julia Driver presents an account of motive or trait utilitarianism, one that has been taken as “the most detailed and thoroughly defended recent formulation” of consequentialist virtue ethics. On Driver’s account character traits are morally virtuous if and only if they generally lead to good consequences for society. Various commentators have taken Driver to task over this account of virtue, which she terms “pure evaluational externalism.” They object that, on Driver’s account of virtue, it could turn out that traits traditionally understood as pernicious are actually virtuous. While many writers have speculated about the forms new ‘virtues’ might take in a hypothetical world, I will argue that at least one trait that is seemingly pernicious but would have to be counted as virtuous by Driver already exists.”

<sup>25</sup> “In ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’ Wayne Sumner argues that (1) as a matter of necessity, virtue is intrinsically prudentially rewarding, and (2) if all else is equal, the virtuous will fare better than the non-virtuous. In this article, I reproduce and criticize those arguments. I offer several objections to the argument for the first thesis; each objection makes the same basic point: contrary to what Sumner assumes, certain contingent facts over and above a person’s being virtuous have to obtain if virtue is to issue in any prudential reward. I object to Sumner’s second thesis by arguing that moral neutrality can be at least as welfare-enhancing as moral virtuosity. Finally, I argue that even if virtue were intrinsically rewarding in the way Sumner envisions, it would still be impossible to determine a priori whether adopting a virtuous lifestyle would be prudentially rational.”

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<sup>26</sup> “John McDowell argued that the virtuous person (VP) knows no temptation: her perception of a situation silences all competing motivations – be it fear in the face of danger or a strong desire. The VP cannot recognize any reason to act non-virtuously as a reason, and is never inclined to act non-virtuously. This view rests on the requirement that the VP rationally respond, and not merely react, to the environment – it rests on the requirement that the relation between the VP and the world (ethical requirements) must rule out the possibility that the VP is a brain in a vat. I will argue that the opposite is true: virtue requires a sensitivity to temptation. The VP, as such, must be able to recognize reasons for performing non-virtuous actions as reasons, and be inclined to perform them. She must find nothing human alien. This is so because the VP must possess the ability to understand non-virtuous agents, and understanding necessarily involves vulnerability to temptation. Otherwise, it will be argued, the VP views the actions of others as determined from outside the space of reasons. But the VP, like any other person, must have the ability to view the actions of others as rational responses to the environment, not only as reactions to it. Put differently, the VP’s view of others must rule out the possibility that they are brains in a vat – the possibility that their actions are merely caused, rather than justified, by the facts. Finally, it will be suggested that an amended conception of the VP can meet both requirements: view others as rationally responsive to the world, without relinquishing its relation to the facts.”

<sup>27</sup> “Can men who dominate women nevertheless be happy or lead flourishing lives? Building on Claudia Card’s exploration of moral luck, this paper considers the belief that male dominators cannot be happy. The discussion ranges over both virtue theory and empirical research into the “belief in a just world.” I conclude that there are reasons to avoid believing that male dominators cannot be happy or flourish, and that feminism does not need that belief.”

<sup>28</sup> “The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes various forms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s that character traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since then social psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through the ignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people’s conceptions of personality and character rather than on the accuracy of these conceptions). Similarly, the political theorist R. Hardin has argued for situational explanations of bloody social disputes in the former Yugoslavia and in Africa, rather than explanations in terms of ethnic hatred for example. A version of virtue ethics might identify virtues as characteristics of acts rather than character traits, as traits consisting in actual regularities in behavior, or as robust dispositions that would manifest themselves also in counterfactual situations.”

<sup>29</sup> “In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such as rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate several distinct, though related, objections grounded in this intuition, and to argue that virtue ethicists have ample resources to respond to these worries. The explanatory primacy of the virtuous over the right or the good emerges as a distinct and viable position.”

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<sup>30</sup> “I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.”

<sup>31</sup> “This paper represents two polemics. One is against suggestions (made by Harman and others) that recent psychological research counts against any claim that there is such a thing as genuine virtue (Cf. Harman, in: Byrne, Stalnaker, Wedgwood (eds.) *Fact and value*, pp 117–127, 2001). The other is against the view that virtue ethics should be seen as competing against such theories as Kantian ethics or consequentialism, particularly in the specification of decision procedures.”

<sup>32</sup> “I examine the Aristotelean conception of virtuous character as firm and unchangeable, a normative ideal endorsed in the currently influential, broadly Aristotelean school of thought known as ‘virtue ethics’. Drawing on central concepts of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, I offer an account of how this ideal is supposed to be realized psychologically. I then consider present-day empirical findings about relevant psychological processes, with special attention to interpersonal processes. The empirical evidence suggests that over time, the same interpersonal processes that sometimes help to sustain character may also disrupt it, even among agents who have the right values in principle. Fortunately, the evidence also suggests some remedial measures. An important philosophical measure, I conclude, is for advocates of virtue ethics to address agents’ psychological need for a systematic decision procedure that will focus attention primarily on substantive ethical considerations, rather than characterological assessment.”

<sup>33</sup> “The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics has been the virtue of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that experimental results from social psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not by appealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion, but rather by appealing to external situational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In response, a number of philosophers have argued that virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical results in question. My own view is that neither side of this debate is looking in the right direction. For there is an impressive array of evidence from the social psychology literature which suggests that many people do possess one or more robust global character traits pertaining to helping others in need. But at the same time, such traits are noticeably different from a traditional virtue like compassion.”

- 2009 [52] Prinz, Jesse (2009): The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 117–44.<sup>35</sup>
- 2009 [53] Russell, Daniel C. (2009): *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues*, Oxford.<sup>36</sup>
- 2009 [54] Sreenivasan, Gopal (2009): Disunity of Virtue, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 195–212.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> “I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and then examine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencing compassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim that many people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping traits fall well short of exhibiting certain central features of compassion.”

<sup>35</sup> “Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are virtuous, and our ideals of what qualifies as well-being. If virtues and well-being are culturally constructed ideals, then the standard strategy for grounding the normativity of virtue ethics in human nature is undermined.”

<sup>36</sup> Publisher’s Description: “One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or ‘phronesis’ – an excellence of deliberating and making choices – which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues – a trend Russell argues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, ‘the virtuous person’. Written in a clear and careful manner, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues* will appeal to philosophers and students alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology.”

Contents: 1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. **Part 1. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action.** 2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics. 3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives. 4. Right Action and ‘the Virtuous Person’. **Part 2. The Enumeration Problem.** 5. The Enumeration Problem. 6. Individuating the Virtues. 7. Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination. **Part 3. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues.** 8. Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions. 9. Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence. 10. From Situationism to Virtue Theory. **Part 4. Defending Hard Virtue Theory.** 11. Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues. 12. Responsibility for Character. Works Cited. Index Locorum. General Index.

- 2009 [55] Upton, Candace L. (2009): The Structure of Character, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 175–93.<sup>38</sup>
- 2009 [56] Upton, Candace L. (2009): Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 103–15.
- 2009 [57] van Zyl, Liezl (2009): Accidental Rightness, *Philosophia* 37, S. 91–104.<sup>39</sup>
- 2009 [58] van Zyl, Liezl (2009): Agent-based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 6, S. 50–69.<sup>40</sup>
- 2009 [59] Vranas, Peter B. M. (2009): Against Moral Character Evaluations: The Undetectability of Virtue and Vice, *Journal of Ethics* 13, S. 213–33.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> “This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed.”

<sup>38</sup> “In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations.”

<sup>39</sup> “In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not – yet needs to – present an account of moral obligation.”

<sup>40</sup> “Agent-based accounts of virtue ethics, such as the one provided by Michael Slote, base the rightness of action in the motive from which it proceeds. A frequent objection to agent-basing is that it does not allow us to draw the commonsense distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons, that is, between act-evaluation and agent-appraisal. I defend agent-basing against this objection, but argue that a more fundamental problem for this account is its apparent failure to provide adequate argue action guidance. I then show that this problem can be solved by supplementing an agent-based criterion of right action with a hypothetical-agent criterion of action guidance.”

<sup>41</sup> “I defend the epistemic thesis that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. (1) Because most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations), one’s prior probability that any given person is fragmented should be high. (2) Because one’s information about specific people does not reliably distinguish those who are fragmented from those who are not, one’s posterior probability that any

- 2008 [60] Annas, Julia (2008): The Phenomenology of Virtue, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7, S. 21–34.<sup>42</sup>
- 2008 [61] Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2008): *Experiments in Ethics*, Cambridge, Mass., S. 33–72 (“The Case against Character”).
- 2008 [62] Arjoon, Surendra (2008): Reconciling Situational Social Psychology with Virtue Ethics, *International Journal of Management Reviews* 10, S. 221–43.<sup>43</sup>
- 2008 [63] Besser-Jones, Lorraine (2008): Social Psychology, Moral Character, and Moral Fallibility, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 76, S. 310–32.<sup>44</sup>

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given person is fragmented should be close to one’s prior – and thus should also be high. (3) Because being fragmented entails being indeterminate (neither good nor bad nor intermediate), one’s posterior probability that any given person is indeterminate should also be high – and the epistemic thesis follows. (1) and (3) rely on previous work; here I support (2) by using a mathematical result together with empirical evidence from personality psychology.”

<sup>42</sup> “What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous – that is, for most of us, not very much.”

<sup>43</sup> “For the past four decades, debate has occurred in respect of situational social psychology and virtue ethics. This paper attempts to reconcile this debate. Situationists propose a fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of dispositions, each of which has a restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of character (behaviour is regulated by long-term dispositions). In order to support this view, they cite a number of experiments. It is proposed that the substantive claims made by situationist social psychologists, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stem from a misunderstanding of concepts of moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations in respect of experimental results. Situationists take a narrow view of character and morality. Evidence from organizational behaviour and managerial research literature supports the view that both situational (organizational) features and inner characteristics (including virtues) are powerful influences and determinants of morally upright and morally deviant behaviour. The role of practical judgement in bridging these views is discussed. As a way forward in reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics, the paper proposes an Aristotelian–Thomistic framework to overcome some of the problems associated with inadequate regulative ideals in building a normative moral theory.”

<sup>44</sup> “In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing as character, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problem

- 2008 [64] Borchers, Dagmar (2008): Moralische Exzellenz – Einführung in die Tugendethik, in *Grundkurs Ethik*. Band 1: *Grundlagen*, hrsg. von Johannes S. Ach, Kurt Bayertz und Ludwig Siep, Paderborn, S. 33–48.
- 2008 [65] Brown, Stephen R. (2008): *Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism*, London.<sup>45</sup>
- 2008 [66] Calhoun, Cheshire (2008): Reflections on the Metavirtue of Sensitivity to Suffering, *Hypatia* 23, S. 182–88. – Zu [152].
- 2008 [67] Friedman, Marilyn (2008): Virtues and Oppression: A Complicated Relationship, *Hypatia* 23, S. 189–96.<sup>46</sup> – Zu [152].
- 2008 [68] Goldie, Peter (2008): Virtues of Art and Human Well-Being, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 82, S. 179–95.<sup>47</sup>

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raised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character-based ethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is the concept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second, exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept of character. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at the same time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, we will see, is a problem of moral motivation.”

<sup>45</sup> Table of Contents: Acknowledgements. 1. Ethical Naturalism. 2. Natural Teleology. 3. Good Human Beings. 4. Facts and values. 5. Moral Virtue and Nature. Works Cited.

“What makes someone a good human being? Is there an objective answer to this question, an answer that can be given in naturalistic terms? For ages philosophers have attempted to develop some sort of naturalistic ethics. Against ethical naturalism, however, notable philosophers have contended that such projects are impossible, due to the existence of some sort of ‘gap’ between facts and values. Others have suggested that teleology, upon which many forms of ethical naturalism depend, is an outdated metaphysical concept.

This book argues that a good human being is one who has those traits the possession of which enables someone to achieve those ends natural to beings like us. Thus, the answer to the question of what makes a good human being is given in terms both objective and naturalistic. The author shows that neither ‘is-ought’ gaps, nor objections concerning teleology pose insurmountable problems for naturalistic virtue ethics. This work is a much needed contribution to the ongoing debate about ethical theory and ethical virtue.”

<sup>46</sup> “This paper raises some minor questions about Lisa Tessman’s book, *Burdened Virtues*. Friedman’s questions pertain, among other things, to the adequacy of a virtue ethical focus on character, the apparent implication of virtue ethics that oppressors suffer damaged characters and are not any better off than the oppressed, the importance of whether privileged persons may have earned their privileges, and the oppositional anger that movement feminists sometimes direct against each other.”

<sup>47</sup> “What is the point of art, and why does it matter to us human beings? The answer that I will give in this paper, following on from an earlier paper on the same subject, is that art matters because our being actively engaged with art, either in its production or in its appreciation, is part of what it is to live well. The focus in the paper will be on the dispositions—the virtues of art production and of art appreciation—that are necessary for this kind of active engagement with art. To begin with, I will argue that these dispositions really are virtues and not mere skills. Then I will show how the virtues of art, and their exercise in artistic activity, interweave with the other kinds of virtue which are exercised in ethical and contemplative activity.

- 2008 [69] Gowans, Christopher W. (2008): Virtue and Nature, *Social Philosophy and Policy* 25, S. 28–55.
- 2008 [70] Hennig, Boris (2008): Tugenden und Absichten. Versuch, Anscombe einen Tugendbegriff zu entnehmen, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft* 115, S. 165–83.
- 2008 [71] Herdt, Jennifer A. (2008): *Putting on Virtue. The Legacy of the Splendid Vices*, Chicago.<sup>48</sup>
- 2008 [72] Horn, Christoph (2008): Glück und Tugend, in *Grundpositionen und Anwendungsprobleme der Ethik (Kolleg Praktische Philosophie Band 2)*, hrsg. von Volker Steenblock, Stuttgart, S. 23–54.<sup>49</sup>
- 2008 [73] Koggel, Christine (2008): Burdening the Burdened Virtues, *Hypatia* 23, S. 197–204. – Zu [152].
- 2008 [74] Kristjánsson, Kristján (2008): An Aristotelian Critique of Situationism, *Philosophy* 83, S. 55–76.<sup>50</sup>

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And finally, I will argue that artistic activity affords, in a special way, a certain kind of emotional sharing that binds us together with other human beings.”

<sup>48</sup> Preface. Introduction. Part I: Splendid Vices and Imperfect Virtues. 1 Aristotle and the Puzzles of Habituation. 2 Augustine: Disordered Loves and the Problem of Pride. 3 Aquinas: Making Space for Pagan Virtue. Part II: Mimetic Virtue. 4 Erasmus: Putting On Christ. 5 The Jesuit Theatrical Tradition: Acting Virtuous. Part III: The Exodus from Virtue. 6 Luther: Saved Hypocrites. 7 Bunyan and Puritan Life-Writing: The Virtue of Self-Examination. Part IV: The Anatomy of Virtue. 8 Jesuits and Jansenists: Gracián and Pascal. 9 Emancipating Worldly Virtue: Nicole, La Rochefoucauld, and Mandeville. Part V: Pagan Virtue and Modern Moral Philosophy. 10 Rousseau and the Virtue of Authenticity. 11 Hume and the Bourgeois Rehabilitation of Pride. 12 Kant and the Pursuit of Noumenal Purity. Conclusion. Notes. Index. “Augustine famously claimed that the virtues of pagan Rome were nothing more than splendid vices. This critique has reinvented itself as a suspicion of acquired virtue as such, and true Christian virtue has, ever since, been set against a false, hypocritical virtue alleged merely to conceal pride. *Putting On Virtue* reveals how a distrust of learned and habituated virtue shaped both early modern Christian moral reflection and secular forms of ethical thought.

Jennifer Herdt develops her claims through an argument of broad historical sweep, which brings together the Aristotelian tradition as taken up by Thomas Aquinas with the early modern thinkers who shaped modern liberalism. In chapters on Luther, Bunyan, the Jansenists, Mandeville, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant, she argues that efforts to guard a radical distinction between true Christian virtue and its tainted imitations ironically fostered the emergence of an autonomous natural ethics that valorized pride and authenticity, while rendering graced human agency increasingly unintelligible. Ultimately, *Putting On Virtue* traces a path from suspicion of virtue to its secular inversion, from confession of dependence to assertion of independence.” (Publisher’s description)

<sup>49</sup> „1. Begriffliche Voraussetzungen: „Glück“ und „Tugend“ im antiken und modernen Wortverständnis. 2. Das vormoderne Modell einer eudämonistischen Tugendethik. 3. Aktuelle Diskussionen über Glück und gelingendes Leben. 4. Zeitgenössische Tugendethiken. 5. Literaturhinweise.“

<sup>50</sup> “Aristotle says that no human achievement has the stability of activities that express virtue. Ethical situationists consider this claim to be refutable by empirical evidence. If that is true, not only Aristotelianism, but folk psychology, contemporary virtue ethics and character education have all been seriously infirmed. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to offer a systematic classification of the existing objections against situationism under four main headings: ‘the methodological objection’, ‘the moral dilemma objection’, ‘the bullet-biting objection’ and ‘the anti-behaviouristic objection’; (2) to resuscitate a more powerful Aristotelian version of the ‘anti-behaviouristic objection’ than advanced by previous critics;

- 2008 [75] Lara, Amy (2008): Virtue Theory and Moral Facts, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 42, S. 331–52.
- 2008 [76] Montmarquet, James A. (2008): The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief, *Philosophy* 83, S. 373–90.<sup>51</sup>
- 2008 [77] Russell, Daniel C. (2008): Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Fundamentality of Virtue, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 45, S. 329–48.
- 2008 [78] Russell, Daniel C. (2008): That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 46, S. 299–315.
- 2008 [79] Snow, Nancy (2008): Virtue and Flourishing, *Journal of Social Philosophy* 39, S. 225–45.
- 2008 [80] Sreenivasan, Gopal (2008): Character and Consistency: Still More Errors, *Mind* 117, S. 603–12.<sup>52</sup> – Zu [120].
- 2008 [81] Stangl, Rebecca (2008): A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics, *Philosophical Quarterly* 58, S. 665–78.<sup>53</sup>
- 2008 [82] Svensson, Frans (2008): Virtue Ethics and Elitism, *Philosophical Papers* 37, S. 131–155.<sup>54</sup>

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and (3) to explore some of the implications of such resuscitation for our understanding of the salience of character and for future studies of its nature.”

<sup>51</sup> “This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: ‘epistemic’ virtues like open-mindedness; ‘motivational’ virtues like courage, and more robustly ‘moral’ virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues.”

<sup>52</sup> “This paper continues a debate among philosophers concerning the implications of situationist experiments in social psychology for the theory of virtue. In a previous paper (2002), I argued among other things that the sort of character trait problematized by Hartshorne and May’s (1928) famous study of honesty is not the right sort to trouble the theory of virtue. Webber (2006) criticizes my argument, alleging that it founders on an ambiguity in ‘cross-situational consistency’ and that Milgram’s (1974) obedience experiment is immune to the objections I levelled against Hartshorne and May. Here I respond to his criticisms. The most important error in Webber’s argument is that it overlooks a distinction between ‘one time performance’ experiments and ‘iterated trial’ experiments. I explain why the former cannot begin to trouble the theory of virtue.”

<sup>53</sup> “There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues.”

<sup>54</sup> “Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the basic normative requirement of virtue ethics.”

- 2008 [83] Tessman, Lisa (2008): Reply to Critics, *Hypatia* 23, S. 205–16.<sup>55</sup> – Zu [66], [67], [73].
- 2008 [84] Upton, Candace L. (2008): Virtue Ethics, Character, and Normative Receptivity, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 5, S. 77–95.<sup>56</sup>
- 2008 [85] White, Richard (2008): *Radical Virtues: Moral Wisdom and the Ethics of Contemporary Life*, Lanham.<sup>57</sup>
- 2007 [86] Baehr, Jason (2007): On the Reliability of Moral and Intellectual Virtues, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 456–70.<sup>58</sup>
- 2007 [87] Baxley, Anne Margaret (2007): The Price of Virtue, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 88, S. 40–23.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> “Tessman responds to her three critics’ comments on *Burdened Virtues*, focusing on their concerns with her stipulation of an “inclusivity requirement,” according to which one cannot be said to flourish without contributing to the flourishing of an inclusive collectivity. Tessman identifies a naturalized approach to ethics – which she distinguishes from the naturalism she implicitly endorsed in *Burdened Virtues* – that illuminates how a conception of flourishing that meets the inclusivity requirement could carry moral authority.”

<sup>56</sup> “Classically-conceived accounts of character posit traits that are both dynamic and global. Dynamic traits produce behavior, and global traits produce behavior across the full range of situation kinds relevant to a particular trait. If you are classically just, for example, you would behave justly across the full range of situation kinds relevant to justice. But classical traits are too crude to fulfill trait attributions’ intrinsically normative purpose, which is to reflect the moral merit agents deserve. I defend an extra-classical account of character traits that endorses flexible traits that might issue in behavior across any narrow or broad range of situation kinds, and static traits that might issue in no behavior at all. Extra-classical traits are more subtle and sensitive, and so are normatively receptive to the credit that psychologically-complicated agents merit. Further, extra-classical traits can fulfill all the unproblematic roles of classical traits. Extra-classicism is, hence, a significant and substantial improvement upon classically conceived character traits and traditional virtue ethics.”

<sup>57</sup> Contents: Introduction. Chapter One: Courage. Chapter Two: Temperance. Chapter Three: Justice. Chapter Four: Compassion. Chapter Five: Wisdom. Conclusion.

“What is a good life? What does it mean to be a good person? Richard White answers these questions by considering aspects of moral goodness through the virtues: courage, temperance, justice, compassion and wisdom. White explores how moral virtues affect and support social movements such as pacifism, environmentalism, multiculturalism, and animal rights. Drawing on the works of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Nietzsche and others, White’s philosophical treatment of virtue ethics is extended through historical and cross-cultural analysis, and he examines the lives of Socrates, Buddha, and Gandhi who lived virtuous lives to help the reader understand and acquire moral wisdom.”

<sup>58</sup> “I examine here whether reliability is a defining feature of (moral or intellectual) virtues. I argue (1) that reliability is *not* a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they often are) as “personal excellences,” but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue according to which reliability *is* a defining feature. I also argue (3) that even on the former conception, a certain rational *belief* pertaining to reliability is essential and (4) that reliability itself, while not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a concomitant of it.”

<sup>59</sup> “Aristotle famously held that there is a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. He captures this contrast by insisting on a distinction

- 2007 [88] Berges, Sandrine (2007): Virtue Ethics, Politics, and the Function of Laws: The Parent Analogy in Plato's *Menexenus*, *Dialogue* 46, S. 211–30.<sup>60</sup>
- 2007 [89] Calder, Todd (2007): Against Consequentialist Theories of Virtue and Vice, *Utilitas* 19, S. 201–19.<sup>61</sup>
- 2007 [90] Everitt, Nicholas (2007): Some Problems with Virtue Theory, *Philosophy* 82, S. 275–99.<sup>62</sup>
- 2007 [91] Hacker-Wright, John (2007): Moral Status in Virtue Ethics, *Philosophy* 82, S. 449–73.<sup>63</sup>
- 2007 [92] Keller, Simon (2007): Virtue ethics is self-effacing, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85, S. 221–31.<sup>64</sup>

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between continence and full virtue. One way of accounting for the important difference here is to suppose that, for the genuinely virtuous person, the requirements of virtue “silence” competing reasons for action. I argue that the silencing interpretation is not compelling. As Aristotle rightly saw, virtue can have a cost, and a mark of the wise person is that she recognizes it.”

<sup>60</sup> “Can virtue ethics say anything worthwhile about laws? What would a virtue-ethical account of good laws look like? I argue that a plausible answer to that question can be found in Plato’s parent analogies in the *Crito* and the *Menexenus*. I go on to show that the *Menexenus* gives us a philosophical argument to the effect that laws are just only if they enable citizens to flourish. I then argue that the resulting virtue-ethical account of just laws is not viciously paternalistic. Finally, I refute the objection that the virtue-ethical account I am proposing is not distinct from a consequentialist account.”

<sup>61</sup> “Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort.”

<sup>62</sup> “Virtue ethics (VE for short) is currently so widely embraced that different versions of the theory can now be distinguished. Some of these are mapped out in Statman’s useful introduction to his collection. There are enough of these versions to constitute a family, and consequently what they share is a family resemblance rather than agreement to a defining set of necessary and sufficient conditions. What I propose to do, therefore, is to criticise one of the main versions of VE. Rosalind Hursthouse is the main proponent of the version which I will criticise. I choose her as a spokesperson, not because her version of VE is especially weak. On the contrary, it is because she is one of the leading protagonists of VE, and because her writings provide a lucid, powerful and elegant exposition of VE that her version of the theory is an appropriate object of scrutiny.”

<sup>63</sup> “My contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of moral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I argue that the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtues like justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by that conception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of justice. I advocate a conception of the virtue of justice that can account for the cases that pose problems for the legalistic views of moral status and discuss what ideal moral debate looks like on this view.”

- 2007 [93] Kupfer, Joseph H. (2007): *Prostitutes, Musicians, and Self-Respect: Virtues and Vices of Personal Life*, Lanham.<sup>65</sup>
- 2007 [94] Kupperman, Joel J. (2007): *Ethics and Qualities of Life*, Oxford, S. 183–90 (“Appendix: Virtue Ethics”).
- 2007 [95] Lemos, John (2007): Foot and Aristotle on Virtues and Flourishing, *Philosophia* 37, S. 43–62.<sup>66</sup>
- 2007 [96] McAleer, Sean (2007): An Aristotelian Account of Virtue Ethics: An Essay in Moral Taxonomy, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 88, S. 208–25.<sup>67</sup>
- 2007 [97] Setiya, Kieran (2007): *Reasons without Rationalism*, Princeton.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> “An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our acts. In his influential paper ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’ [1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be self-effacing, if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker’s argument is often taken to provide a reason to give up consequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a mistake. Virtue ethics is self-effacing in just the same way as are the theories that Stocker attacks. Or, at the very least: if there is a way for virtue ethics to avoid self-effacement then there are ways for its rivals to avoid self-effacement too. Therefore, considerations of self-effacement provide no reason to prefer virtue ethics to its major rivals.”

<sup>65</sup> “Introduction. Chapter 1. The Moral Perspective of Humility. Chapter 2. Sentimentalizing Emotion. Chapter 3. Generosity of Spirit. Chapter 4. Overcoming Envy. Chapter 5. When Waiting is Weightless: The Virtue of Patience. Chapter 6. No Regrets, No Debts: The Virtue of Gratitude. Chapter 7. Romantic Love and Moral Growth. Chapter 8. Prostitutes, Musicians, and Self-Respect. Conclusion.”

<sup>66</sup> “This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in Philippa Foot’s recent book, *Natural Goodness*, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not.”

<sup>67</sup> “I argue that a virtue ethics takes virtue to be more basic than rightness and at least as basic as goodness. My account is Aristotelian because it avoids the excessive inclusivity of Martha Nussbaum’s account and the deficient inclusivity of Gary Watson’s account. I defend the account against the objection that Aristotle does not have a virtue ethics by its lights, and conclude with some remarks on moral taxonomy.”

<sup>68</sup> “Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question “Why should I be moral?” and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In *Reasons without Rationalism*, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The “should” of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this “virtue theory” is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act “under the guise of the good,” or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, *Reasons without*

- 2007 [98] Stichter, Matt (2007): Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10, S. 183–94.<sup>69</sup>
- 2007 [99] Walker, Rebecca L./Ivanhoe, Philip J. (Hrsg.) (2007): *Working Virtue. Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*, Oxford 2007.<sup>70</sup>
- 2007 [100] Webber, Jonathan (2007): Character, Common-Sense, and Expertise, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10, S. 89–104.<sup>71</sup>

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*Rationalism*” is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.”

Contents: Preface ix – Introduction 1 – 1. “Squeezing the Good into the Right through the Tubes of Imperfection” 7 – 2. The Relevance of Action Theory 14 – PART ONE: Explaining Action 21 – 1. A Puzzle about Intention 23 – 2. The Belief-Desire Model 28 – 3. Acting for Reasons 39 – 4. Solving the Puzzle 48 – 5. A Causal Theory of Action? 56 – 6. Against the Guise of the Good 59 – PART TWO: Why Virtue Matters to the Study of Practical Reason 68 – 1. Character and Practical Thought 70 – 2. An Argument for the Virtue Theory 79 – 3. Practical Reason and the Guise of the Good 86 – 4. Motivation and Desire 99 – 5. Self-Knowledge as the Aim of Action 107 – Conclusion 116 – Bibliography 121 – Index 129.

<sup>69</sup> “Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, is only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects this skill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theory is Socratic. This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does not reject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle’s position on the skill model, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skill than the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skills very much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed by Aristotle. Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely to prove unsuccessful.”

<sup>70</sup> Contents: 1. Introduction , Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe 2. Caring as Relation and Virtue in Teaching, Nel Noddings 3. Professing Medicine, Virtue Based Ethics and the Retrieval of Professionalism, Edmund D. Pellegrino 4. Doctoring and Self-Forgiveness, Jeffrey Blustein 5. Virtue Ethics as Professional Ethics: The Case of Psychiatry, Jennifer Radden 6. Trust, Suffering, and the Aesculapian Virtues, Annette C. Baier 7. Environmental Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse 8. The Good Life for Nonhuman Animals: What Virtue Requires of Humans, Rebecca L. Walker 9. Law, Morality, and Virtue, Peter Koller 10. Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics, Christine Swanton 11. Racial Virtues, Lawrence Blum 12. Virtue and a Warrior’s Anger, Nancy Sherman 13. Famine, Affluence and Virtue, Michael Slote 14. Filial Piety as a Virtue, Philip J. Ivanhoe.

<sup>71</sup> “Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role

- 2007 [101] Webber, Jonathan (2007): Character, Global and Local, *Utilitas* 19, S. 430–34.<sup>72</sup>
- 2007 [102] Wolf, Susan (2007): Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues, *Ratio* 20, S. 145–67.<sup>73</sup>
- 2006 [103] Adams, Robert M. (2006): *A Theory of Virtue. Excellence in Being for the Good*, Oxford.<sup>74</sup>

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required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people's behaviour, difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations between them must be based on more objective data."

<sup>72</sup> "Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An individual's behaviour is governed not by a set of 'global' traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational feature, they argue, but by a much larger array of 'local' traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features. But the data cited by these philosophers support their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We should not adopt the former conception, moreover, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not revise our understanding of character in the way proposed."

<sup>73</sup> "The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defence of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge – specifically, evaluative knowledge of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined."

<sup>74</sup> "The distinguished philosopher Robert M. Adams presents a major work on virtue, which is once again a central topic in ethical thought. *A Theory of Virtue* is a systematic, comprehensive framework for thinking about the moral evaluation of character. Many recent attempts to stake out a place in moral philosophy for this concern define virtue in terms of its benefits for the virtuous person or for human society more generally. In Part One of this book Adams presents and defends a conception of virtue as intrinsic excellence of character, worth prizing for its own sake and not only for its benefits. In the other two parts he addresses two challenges to the ancient idea of excellence of character. One challenge arises from the importance of altruism in modern ethical thought, and the question of what altruism has to do with intrinsic excellence. Part Two argues that altruistic benevolence does indeed have a crucial place in excellence of character, but that moral virtue should also be expected to involve excellence in being for other goods besides the well-being (and the rights) of other persons. It explores relations among cultural goods, personal relationships, one's own good, and the good of others, as objects of excellent motives. The other challenge, the subject of Part Three of the book, is typified by doubts about the reality of moral virtue, arising from experiments and conclusions in social psychology. Adams explores in detail the prospects for an empirically realistic conception of excellence of character as an object of moral aspiration, endeavor, and education. He argues that such a conception will involve renunciation of the ancient thesis of the unity or mutual implication of all virtues, and acknowledgment of sufficient 'moral luck' in the development of any

- 2006 [104] Brännmark, Johan (2006): From Virtue to Decency, *Metaphilosophy* 37, S. 589–604.<sup>75</sup>
- 2006 [105] Chappell, Timothy (2006): The Variety of Life and the Unity of Practical Wisdom, in *Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics*, hrsg. von Timothy Chappell, Oxford, S. 136–57.
- 2006 [106] Chappell, Timothy (Hrsg.) (2006): *Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics*, Oxford.<sup>76</sup>
- 2006 [107] Coope, Christopher Miles (2006): Modern Virtue Ethics, in *Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics*, hrsg. von Timothy Chappell, Oxford, S. 20–52.
- 2006 [108] Cox, Damian (2006): Agent-based Theories of Right Action, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9, S. 505–15.<sup>77</sup>
- 2006 [109] Driver, Julia (2006): *Ethics. The Fundamentals*, Oxford, S. 136–53 (“Virtue Ethics”).
- 2006 [110] Driver, Julia (2006): Virtue Theory, in *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, hrsg. von James Dreier, Oxford, S. 113–23.
- 2006 [111] Fleming, Diana (2006): The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Ethics, *Ratio* 19, S. 24–42.<sup>78</sup>

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individual’s character to make virtue very largely a gift, rather than an individual achievement, though nonetheless excellent and admirable for that.

Contents: Part One: What Is Virtue? 1. Introduction 2. Excellence in Being for the Good 3. Wickedness and Vices 4. Virtue and its Benefits Part Two: Self and Other 5. Altruism 6. Common Projects 7. Self-Love and the Vices of Self-Preference Part Three: Are There Really Any Virtues? 8. Moral Inconsistency 9. Moral Frailty and Moral Luck 10. Do the Virtues All Imply Each Other? 11. Plural and Integrated Virtue 12. Can Virtue Be Taught?”

<sup>75</sup> “In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.”

<sup>76</sup> Contents: Introduction, Timothy Chappell. 1. Modern virtue ethics, Christopher Coope. 2. The admirable life and the desirable life, Linda Zagzebski. 3. Virtue and rights in Aristotle’s best regime, Fred Miller. 4. The virtues and vices of virtue jurisprudence, Antony Duff. 5. Habituation as *mimêsis*, Hallvard Fossheim. 6. Moral incompetence, Adam Morton. 7. The variety of life and the unity of practical wisdom, Timothy Chappell. 8. Moral sense and virtue in Hume’s ethics, Paul Russell. 9. Can Nietzsche be both a virtue ethicist and an existentialist?, Christine Swanton. 10. Manners, morals, and practical wisdom, Karen Stohr. 11. The hardboiled detective as moralist, Sandrine Berges. 12. ‘Like the Bloom on Youths’: How pleasure completes our lives, Johan Braennmark. 13. Mixed determinates: pleasure, good, and truth, Theodore Scaltsas. 14. Three dogmas of desire, Talbot Brewer.

<sup>77</sup> “In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.”

- 2006 [112] Hurka, Thomas (2006): Virtuous Act, Virtuous Dispositions, *Analysis* 66, S. 69–76.
- 2006 [113] Hursthouse, Rosalind (2006): Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?, in *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, hrsg. von James Dreier, Oxford, S. 99–112.
- 2006 [114] Kupperman, Joel J. (2006): *Six Myths About the Good Life: Thinking About What Has Value*, Indianapolis, S. 82–109 (“Myth Five – There Is No Real Connection, At Least in This Life, Between True Virtue and a Desirable Kind of Life”), S. 110–27 (“Myth Six – True Virtue Is Impeccable”).
- 2006 [115] Stohr, Karen E. (2006): Contemporary Virtue Ethics, *Philosophy Compass* 1, S. 22–7.
- 2006 [116] Tiberius, Valerie (2006): How to Think About Virtue and Right, *Philosophical Papers* 35, S. 247–265.<sup>79</sup> – Zu [179].
- 2006 [117] Toner, Christopher (2006): The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics, *Philosophy* 81, S. 595–618.<sup>80</sup>
- 2006 [118] van Hooft, Stan (2006): *Understanding Virtue Ethics*, Chesham.
- 2006 [119] Weaver, Gary R. (2006): Virtue in Organizations: Moral Identity as a Foundation for Moral Agency, *Organization Studies* 27, S. 341–368.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> “Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics makes essential reference to the notion of a stable, robust character-trait. It also claims to be constrained by at least a minimal degree of psychological realism. Recent developments in empirical psychology have drawn into question the evidence for the existence of such robust traits, arguing that it rests on what has been called a ‘undamental attribution error’. Virtue ethics has thus seemingly been made vulnerable to criticisms that it is essentially dependent on an erroneous, folk-psychological, notion of character and, so, must either abandon their characteristic notion of virtue or forego any pretensions to psychological realism.

I develop a two-pronged response to this objection. First, I argue that there is reason to question much of the empirical evidence and that such evidence as does exist can easily be accommodated by virtue ethics. Next, I argue that even if we allow that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories does sometimes presuppose a stronger conception of character-traits than is warranted by the evidence, this does not significantly undermine the virtue ethicist’s project.”

<sup>79</sup> “Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous agent’s reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the Tightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation.”

<sup>80</sup> “Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to others and ultimately to the Good. I conclude that while some species of virtue ethics may be self-centred, the objection cannot be used to indict the whole genus.”

- 2006 [120] Webber, Jonathan (2006): Character, Consistency, and Classification, *Mind* 115, S. 651–58.<sup>82</sup> – Zu [202]. Dazu: [80].
- 2006 [121] Webber, Jonathan (2006): Virtue, Character and Situation, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 3, S. 193–213.<sup>83</sup> – Zu [193].
- 2006 [122] Welchman, Jennifer (Hrsg.) (2006): *The Practice of Virtue. Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics*, Indianapolis.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> “Framing issues of organizational ethics in terms of virtues and moral agency (rather than in terms of rules and ethical behavior) has implications for the way social science addresses matters of morality in organizations. In particular, attending to matters of virtue and moral agency directs attention to the moral identity, or self-concept, of persons, and to the circumstances that influence self-identity. This article develops parallels between philosophical theories of virtue and the concept of moral identity as developed in social cognitive identity theory. Explicating notions of virtue and moral agency in terms of social cognitive identity theory, in turn, helps direct attention to a range of factors – including both organizational and extraorganizational, macro-cultural ones – that can foster or inhibit moral agency in organizations.”

<sup>82</sup> “John Doris has recently argued that since we do not possess character traits as traditionally conceived, virtue ethics is rooted in a false empirical presupposition. Gopal Sreenivasan has claimed, in a paper in *Mind*, that Doris has not provided suitable evidence for his empirical claim. But the experiment Sreenivasan focuses on is not one that Doris employs, and neither is it relevantly similar in structure. The confusion arises because both authors use the phrase ‘cross-situational consistency’ to describe the aspect of character traits that they are concerned with, but neither defines this phrase, and it is ambiguous: Doris uses it in one sense, Sreenivasan in another. Partly for this reason, the objections Sreenivasan raises fail to block the argument Doris provides. In particular, the most reliable data Doris employs, Milgram’s famous study of authority, is entirely immune to Sreenivasan’s objections. Sreenivasan has not shown, therefore, that Doris provides unsuitable evidence for his claim.”

<sup>83</sup> “Philosophers have recently argued that traditional discussions of virtue and character presuppose an account of behaviour that experimental psychology has shown to be false. Behaviour does not issue from global traits such as prudence, temperance, courage or fairness, they claim, but from local traits such as sailing-in-rough-weather-with-friends-courage and office-party-temperance. The data employed provides evidence for this view only if we understand it in the light of a behaviourist construal of traits in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the light of the more traditional construal in terms of inner events such as inclinations. More recent experiments have shown this traditional conception to have greater explanatory and predictive power than its behaviourist rival. So we should retain the traditional conception, and hence reject the proposed alteration to our understanding of behaviour. This discussion has further implications for future philosophical investigations of character and virtue.”

<sup>84</sup> This collection provides readings from five classic thinkers with importantly distinct approaches to virtue theory, along with five new essays from contemporary thinkers that apply virtue theories to the resolution of practical moral problems. Jennifer Welchman’s Introduction discusses the history of virtue theory. A short introduction to each reading highlights the distinctive aspects of the view expressed. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Preface. Introduction. PART I: CLASSIC VIRTUE THEORIES: Aristotle: Introduction. Nicomachean Ethics. Seneca: Introduction. On the Happy Life. Moral Letters to Lucilius. Francis Hutcheson: Introduction. An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. David Hume: Introduction. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Friedrich Nietzsche: Introduction. On the Genealogy of Morality. Beyond Good and Evil. PART II: CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS: Rosalind Hursthouse: Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals. Julia Annas: Seneca: Stoic

- 2006 [123] Wielenberg, Erik J. (2006): Saving Character, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9, S. 461–91.<sup>85</sup>
- 2006 [124] Winter, Michael/Tauer, John (2006): Virtue Theory and Social Psychology, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 40, S. 73–82.
- 2006 [125] Woodcock, Scott (2006): Philippa Foot’s Virtue Ethics Has an Achilles’ Heel, *Dialogue* 45, S. 445–68.<sup>86</sup>
- 2006 [126] Zagzebski, Linda Trinkhaus (2006): The Admirable Life and the Desirable Life, in *Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics*, hrsg. von Timothy Chappell, Oxford, S. 53–66.
- 2005 [127] Annas, Julia (2005): Comments on John Doris’s *Lack of Character*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71, S. 636–42. – Vgl. dazu: [134].
- 2005 [128] Annas, Julia (2005): Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 11–29.
- 2005 [129] Arpaly, Nomy (2005): Comments on *Lack of Character* by John Doris, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71, S. 643–47. – Vgl. dazu: [134].
- 2005 [130] Bradely, Ben (2005): Virtue Consequentialism, *Utilitas* 17, S. 282–98.<sup>87</sup>

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Philosophy as a Guide to Living. Mark H. Waymack: Francis Hutcheson, Virtue Ethics and Public Policy. Jacqueline Taylor: Humean Humanity Versus Hate. Clancy W. Martin: Nietzsche’s Virtues and the Virtues of Business.

<sup>85</sup> “In his recent book *Lack of Character*, Jon Doris argues that people typically lack character (understood in a particular way). Such a claim, if correct, would have devastating implications for moral philosophy and for various human moral projects (e.g. character development). I seek to defend character against Doris’s challenging attack. To accomplish this, I draw on Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant to identify some of the central components of virtuous character. Next, I examine in detail some of the central experiments in social psychology upon which Doris’s argument is based. I argue that, properly understood, such experiments reveal differences in the characters of their subjects, not that their subjects lack character altogether. I conclude with some reflections on the significance of such experiments and the importance of character.”

<sup>86</sup> “My aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book *Natural Goodness*. Foot’s proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory’s normative implications. Foot’s appeal to natural facts about human goodness is in this way singled out as an Achilles’ heel that undermines her attempt to establish an independent framework for virtue ethics. This problem might seem to be one that is uniquely applicable to the bold naturalism of Foot’s methodology; however, I claim that the problem is indicative of a more general problem for all contemporary articulations of virtue ethics.”

<sup>87</sup> “Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properly formulated. I criticize Julia Driver’s formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. I maintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are really disguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actual circumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist to

- 2005 [131] Brady, Michael S. (2005): The Value of the Virtues, *Philosophical Studies* 125, S. 85–114.<sup>88</sup>
- 2005 [132] Cafaro, Philip/Sandler, Ronald (Hrsg.) (2005): *Environmental Virtue Ethics*, Lanham.<sup>89</sup>
- 2005 [133] Doris, John M. (2005): Précis of *Lack of Character*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71, S. 632–35.
- 2005 [134] Doris, John M. (2005): Replies: Evidence and Sensibility, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71, S. 656–77.
- 2005 [135] Gardiner, Stephen M. (2005): Seneca’s Virtuous Moral Rules, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 30–59.
- 2005 [136] Gardiner, Stephen M. (Hrsg.) (2005): *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, Ithaca.
- 2005 [137] Gill, Christopher (Hrsg.) (2005): *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics*, Oxford.
- 2005 [138] Hanafin, John/Coady, C. A. (Hrsg.) (2005): *Unity, Separateness and Conflict in the Virtues*, Aldershot.
- 2005 [139] Harris, George W. (2005): The Virtues, Perfectionist Goods, and Pessimism, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 193–210.
- 2005 [140] Higgins, Kathleen Marie (2005): Negative Virtues: Zhuangzi’s *Wuwei*, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 125–41.
- 2005 [141] Irwin, T. H. (2005): Do Virtues Conflict? Aquinas’s Answer, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 60–77.
- 2005 [142] Jacobson, Daniel (2005): Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception, *Ethical*

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account for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodness and badness.”

<sup>88</sup> “Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves *knowledge*. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and defend it against a number of objections.”

<sup>89</sup> Contents: *Part One: Recognizing Environmental Virtue Ethics*: Introduction: Environmental Virtue Ethics (Ronald Sandler), The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Language (Louke van Wensveen), Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics (Philip Cafaro). *Part Two: Environmental Virtue Ethics Theory*: Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments (Thomas Hill, Jr.), Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole (Holmes Rolston, III), Virtue Ethics as Foundational for a Global Ethic (Laura Westra), A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (Bill Shaw), Virtue Ethics and Repugnant Conclusions (David Schmidtz and Matt Zwolinski), *Part Three: Environmental Virtues And Vices*: Benevolence as an Environmental Virtue (Geoffrey Frasz), Gluttony, Arrogance, Greed and Apathy: An Exploration of Environmental Vice (Philip Cafaro), Religion and Environmental Virtue (Charles Taliaferro), Cardinal Environmental Virtues (Louke van Wensveen), *Part Four: The Application Of Environmental Virtue*: Synergistic Environmental Virtues: Consumerism and Human Flourishing (Peter Wenz), A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically Modified Crops (Ronald Sandler)

- 2005 [143] Lovibond, Sabina (2005): Virtue, Nature, and Providence, in *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics*, hrsg. von Christopher Gill, Oxford, S. 99–112.
- 2005 [144] Millgram, Elijah (2005): Reasonably Virtuous, in Millgram, *Ethics Done Right. Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory*, Cambridge, S. 133–67.
- 2005 [145] Sabin, John/Silver, Maury (2005): Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued, *Ethics* 115, S. 535–62.
- 2005 [146] Sandler, Ronald (2005): Ignorance and Virtue, *Philosophical Papers* 34, S. 261–72.<sup>91</sup>
- 2005 [147] Sandler, Ronald (2005): What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue?, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 39, S. 383–97.
- 2005 [148] Siep, Ludwig (2005): Virtues, Values, and Moral Objectivity, in *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics*, hrsg. von Christopher Gill, Oxford, S. 83–98.
- 2005 [149] Solomon, Robert C. (2005): Erotic Love as a Moral Virtue, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 81–100.
- 2005 [150] Solomon, Robert C. (2005): “What’s Character Got to Do with It?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71, S. 648–55. – Zu [193]. Vgl. dazu: [134].
- 2005 [151] Swanton, Christine (2005): Nietzschean Virtue Ethics, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 179–92.
- 2005 [152] Tessman, Lisa (2005): *Burdened Virtues. Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles*, Oxford.<sup>92</sup> – Vgl. dazu (aus dem “Symposium on Lisa Tessman’s *Burdened Virtues*” in *Hypatia* 23

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<sup>90</sup> “Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism - which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.”

<sup>91</sup> “Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver’s account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role.”

(2008), S. 182–216): [66], [67], [73].

- 2005 [153] Van Zyl, Liezl (2005): In Defence of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, *Philosophical Papers* 34, S. 273–88.<sup>93</sup>
- 2005 [154] Welchman, Jennifer (2005): Virtue Ethics and Human Development: A Pragmatic Approach, in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 142–55.
- 2004 [155] Allard-Nelson, Susan K. (2004): *An Aristotelian Approach to Ethical Theory – The Norms of Virtue*, Lewiston, NY.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Contents: Introduction: Moral Trouble (3) – 1. Regretting the Self One Is (11) – 2. The Damage of Moral Damage (33) – 3. The Ordinary Vices of Domination (53) – 4. Between Indifference and Anguish (81) – 5. The Burden of Political Resistance (107) – 6. Dangerous Loyalties (133) – Conclusion: Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics under Adversity (159) – Works Cited (169) – Index (179).

Description: “Lisa Tessman’s *Burdened Virtues* is a deeply original and provocative work that engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, she addresses the ways in which devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities of flourishing. She describes two different forms of “moral trouble” prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally damaged, prevented from developing or exercising some of the virtues; the second is that the very conditions of oppression require the oppressed to develop a set of virtues that carry a moral cost to those who practice them – traits that Tessman refers to as “burdened virtues.” These virtues have the unusual feature of being disjoined from their bearer’s own well being.

Tessman’s work focuses on issues that have been missed by many feminist moral theories, and her use of the virtue ethics framework brings feminist concerns more closely into contact with mainstream ethical theory. This book will appeal to feminist theorists in philosophy and women’s studies, but also more broadly, ethicists and social theorists.”

<sup>93</sup> “In ‘Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ (2004) Michael Brady rejects agent-based virtue ethics on the grounds that it fails to capture the commonsense distinction between an agent’s doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right reason. In his view, the failure to account for this distinction has paradoxical results, making it unable to explain why an agent has a duty to perform a given action. I argue that Brady’s objection relies on the assumption that an agent-based account is committed to defining obligations in terms of actual motives. If we reject this view, and instead provide a version of agent-basing that determines obligations in terms of the motives of the hypothetical virtuous agent, the paradox disappears.”

<sup>94</sup> “The project of this work is to combine an interpretative study of Aristotle’s thinking about the foundational elements of ethical theory with the formulation of a theory of ethical normativity that is based on those same elements, but that is independently formulated and analyzed. In particular, the book argues that virtue ethics, of an Aristotelian type, can provide a coherent and satisfying theory of normativity, although this has sometimes been denied in modern scholarship. Normativity is sometimes thought to require a theory of a deductive type, in which ethical norms are derived from the principle of universalization (Kant’s view) or from a universal principle, such as, in Utilitarianism, the maximization of human happiness. The claim here is that normativity can also, and more plausibly, be established inductively through an examination of human nature—as understood through a variety of means, including the ethical agent’s own sense of what human nature consists in and scientific psychology—and the interrelated Aristotelian ideas of virtue, happiness, and particular relationships. The suggestion is that, if norms are grounded in this way, we can establish a normative framework that corresponds to the reality of human shared and individual experience and that is, therefore, more cogent than one that depends (deductively) on abstract, universal principles.

- 2004 [156] Annas, Julia (2004): Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 78 (2), S. 61–75.
- 2004 [157] Brady, Michael (2004): Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, *Philosophical Papers* 33, S. 1–10.<sup>95</sup>
- 2004 [158] Brown, Stephen R. (2004): Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 1, S. 197–209.
- 2004 [159] Card, Robert F. (2004): Pure Aretaic Ethics and Character, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 38, S. 473–84.
- 2004 [160] Driver, Julia (2004): Response to my Critics, *Utilitas* 16, S. 33–41.<sup>96</sup> – Zu [165], [168].
- 2004 [161] Esser, Andrea Marlen (2004): *Eine Ethik für Endliche. Kants Tugendlehre in der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
- 2004 [162] Graham, Gordon (2004): *Eight Theories of Ethics*, London, S. 53–70 (“Naturalism and Virtue Theory”).
- 2004 [163] Hursthouse, Rosalind (2004): On the Grounding of the Virtues in Human Nature, in *Was ist das für den Menschen Gute? Menschliche Natur und Güterlehre. / What Is Good for a Human Being? Human Nature and Values*, hrsg. von Jan Szaif und Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Berlin, S. 263–75.
- 2004 [164] Kamtekar, Rachana (2004): Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character, *Ethics* 114, S. 458–91.

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This Aristotelian, inductive, theory is offered as embodying a cogent account of ethical normativity, which represents a contribution to current philosophical debate on the nature and basis of ethical norms.

Contents: Abbreviations. Notes on Terminology and Translation. Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. Principles, Guidelines, and Particular Facts. 2. Human Nature, Telos, and the Human Capacity for Excellence. 3. The Development of Character: Human Excellence, Emotion, Neurobiology, and the Moral Virtues. 4. Partiality, Universalizability, and the Function of Normative Theory. Conclusion. Bibliography. Index”

<sup>95</sup> “Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent’s motives and character traits. One of the problems any such approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agent’s doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethics ultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and to this extent ought to be rejected. I focus first on Michael Slote’s agent-based theory, according to which the moral status of actions depends upon an agent’s actual motives, and argue that this leads to a paradox. I then consider whether the ‘counterfactual’ version of agent-basing favoured by Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zagzebski fares any better, and conclude that it does not.”

<sup>96</sup> “This essay is a rejoinder to comments on *Uneasy Virtue* made by Onora O’Neill, John Skorupski, and Michael Slote in this issue. In *Uneasy Virtue* I presented criticisms of traditional virtue theory. I also presented an alternative - a consequentialist account of virtue, one which is a form of ‘pure evaluational externalism’. This type of theory holds that the moral quality of character traits is determined by factors external to agency (e.g. consequences). All three commentators took exception to this account. Therefore, the bulk of my response focuses on defending the externalist account of virtue presented in the final chapters of *Uneasy Virtue*.”

- 2004 [165] O'Neill, Onora (2004): Consequences for Non-consequentialists, *Utilitas* 16, S. 1–11.<sup>97</sup> – Zu [209].
- 2004 [166] Schuster, Josef (2004): Gefühle und ethische Tugenden, in *Abwägende Vernunft. Praktische Rationalität in historischer, systematischer und religionsphilosophischer Perspektive*, hrsg. von Franz-Josef Bormann und Christian Schröer, Berlin, S. 361–80.
- 2004 [167] Siep, Ludwig (2004): Vernunft und Tugend, in *Abwägende Vernunft. Praktische Rationalität in historischer, systematischer und religionsphilosophischer Perspektive*, hrsg. von Franz-Josef Bormann und Christian Schröer, Berlin, S. 344–60.
- 2004 [168] Slote, Michael (2004): Driver's Virtues, *Utilitas* 16, S. 22–32.<sup>98</sup> – Zu [209].
- 2004 [169] Stark, Susan (2004): A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 1, S. 31–50.<sup>99</sup>
- 2004 [170] Swanton, Christine (2004): Satisficing and Perfectionism in Virtue Ethics, in *Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason*, hrsg. von Michael Byron, Cambridge, S. 176–89.

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<sup>97</sup> “Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical reasoning have difficulties in accounting for the value of consequences. Taken neat, consequentialism is too fierce in its emphasis on success and disregard of luck, while non-consequentialism seemingly over-values inner states and undervalues actual results. In *Uneasy Virtue* Julia Driver proposes a form of objective consequentialism which claims that characters are good if they typically (but not invariably) produce good results. This position addresses the problems moral luck raises for consequentialism, but requires some form of realism about traits of character. However, if our knowledge of mental states is ascriptive, this form of objective consequentialism may make excessive demands. Non-consequentialists may gain in so far as the theories of action to which they are typically committed are less demanding, and are built to take account of the typical or systematic connections between states of character and results of action.”

<sup>98</sup> “Julia Driver's *Uneasy Virtue* offers a theory of virtue and the virtues without being an instance of virtue ethics. It presents a consequentialist challenge to recent virtue ethics, but its positive views – and especially its interesting examples – have great significance in their own right. Driver's defence of 'virtues of ignorance' has force despite all the challenges to it that have been mounted over the years. But there are also examples differing from those Driver has mentioned that favour the idea of such virtues. Perhaps certain virtues of religious faith and the virtue necessary for dealing as best one can with moral dilemmas both require ignorance. However, some of the examples Driver does discuss raise the question whether virtue status is based solely on consequences, rather than perhaps having (in addition) a motivational component.”

<sup>99</sup> “Inspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.”

- 2004 [171] Vranas, Peter B. M. (2004): Review of *Lack of Character* by John Doris, *Philosophical Review* 113, S. 284–88. – Zu [193].
- 2003 [172] Annas, Julia (2003): The Structure of Virtue, in *Intellectual Virtue – Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, hrsg. von Micheal DePaul und Linda Zagzebski, Oxford, S. 15–33.
- 2003 [173] Birnbacher, Dieter (2003): *Analytische Einführung in die Ethik*, Berlin, S. 203–6 („Tugendethik“).
- 2003 [174] Carr, David (2003): Character and Moral Choice in the Cultivation of Virtue, *Philosophy* 78, S. 219–32.<sup>100</sup>
- 2003 [175] Das, Ramon (2003): Virtue Ethics and Right Action, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81, S. 324–39.<sup>101</sup>
- 2003 [176] DePaul, Michael/Zagzebski, Linda (Hrsg.) (2003): *Intellectual Virtue – Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, Oxford.
- 2003 [177] Harman, Gilbert (2003): No Character or Personality, *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13, S. 87–94. – Zu [186].
- 2003 [178] Hursthouse, Rosalind (2003): Virtue Ethics, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, hrsg. von Edward Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/>.
- 2003 [179] Johnson, Robert N. (2003): Virtue and Right, *Ethics* 113, S. 810–34. – Dazu: [24], [116].
- 2003 [180] Miller, Christian B. (2003): Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics, *Journal of Ethics* 7, S. 365–92.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> “It is central to virtue ethics both that morally sound action follows from virtuous character, and that virtuous character is itself the product of habitual right judgement and choice: that, in short, we choose our moral characters. However, any such view may appear to encounter difficulty in those cases of moral conflict where an agent cannot simultaneously act (say) both honestly and sympathetically, and in which the choices of agents seem to favour the construction of different moral characters. This paper argues, against possible counter-arguments, for a view of virtue ethics which embraces the diversity of moral character.”

<sup>101</sup> “In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001; Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection: evaluating action requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent’s inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection: they end up relying upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments of rightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they become intuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character.”

<sup>102</sup> “Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the line

- 2003 [181] Pollard, Bill (2003): Can Virtuous Actions be Both Habitual and Rational?, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6, S. 411–25.<sup>103</sup>
- 2003 [182] Sherman, Nancy/White, Heath (2003): Intellectual Virtue: Emotions, Luck, and the Ancients, in *Intellectual Virtue – Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, hrsg. von Micheal DePaul und Linda Zagzebski, Oxford, S. 34–54.
- 2003 [183] Slote, Michael (2003): Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project, *Metaphilosophy* 34, S. 131–143.<sup>104</sup>
- 2003 [184] Smith, R. Scott (2003): *Virtue Ethics and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy of Language after MacIntyre and Hauerwas*, Aldershot.
- 2003 [185] Solomon, David (2003): Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine? in *Intellectual Virtue – Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, hrsg. von Micheal DePaul und Linda Zagzebski, Oxford, S. 57–80.
- 2003 [186] Solomon, Robert C. (2003): Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, *Business Ethics Quarterly* 13, S. 43–62. – Dazu: [177].
- 2003 [187] Stohr, Karen E. (2003): Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue, *Journal of Ethics* 7, S. 339–63.<sup>105</sup>

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of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to briefly sketching a positive account of character trait possession.”

<sup>103</sup> “Virtuous actions seem to be both habitual and rational. But if we combine an intuitive understanding of habituality with the currently predominant paradigm of rational action, these two features of virtuous actions are hard to reconcile. Intuitively, acting habitually is acting as one has before in similar contexts, and automatically, that is, without thinking about it. Meanwhile, contemporary philosophers tend to assume the truth of what I call “the reasons theory of rational action”, which states that all rational actions are “actions for reasons”. Whilst interpretations of this phrase are disputed, I argue that neither of the two leading views – which I call “reasons internalism” and “reasons externalism” – makes room for habitual actions to count as actions for reasons; by the reasons theory, they cannot be rational either. I suggest one way of effecting the reconciliation which, whilst it allows us to keep the reasons theory, requires us to conceive of reasons as even more radically external than current externalists believe them to be.”

<sup>104</sup> “Ethical rationalism has recently dominated the philosophical landscape, but sentimentalist forms of normative ethics (such as the ethics of caring) and of metaethics (such as Blackburn’s projectivism and various ideal-observer and response-dependent views) have also been prominent. But none of this has been systematic in the manner of Hume and Hutcheson. Hume based both ethics and metaethics in his notion of sympathy, but the project sketched here focuses rather on the (related) notion of empathy. I argue that empathy is essential to the development of morally required caring about others and also to deontological limits or restrictions on self-concern and other-concern. But empathy also plays a grounding role in moral judgement. Moral approval and disapproval can be non-circularly understood as empathic reflections of the concern or lack of concern that agents show towards other people; and moral utterances can plausibly be seen not as projections, expressions, or descriptions of sentiment but as “objective” and “non-relative” judgements whose reference and content are fixed by sentiments of approval and disapproval.”

<sup>105</sup> “Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept the thesis that a virtuous agent’s feelings should be in harmony with her judgments about what she should do and that she should find virtuous action easy and

- 2003 [188] Swanton, Christine (2003): *Virtue Ethics. A Pluralistic View*, Oxford.
- 2002 [189] Annas, Julia (2002): My Station and Its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of Virtue, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102, S. 109–123.<sup>106</sup>
- 2002 [190] Brumlik, Micha (2002): *Bildung und Glück. Versuch einer Theorie der Tugenden*, Berlin, Wien.<sup>107</sup>
- 2002 [191] Darwall, Stephen (Hrsg.) (2002): *Virtue Ethics*, Oxford.
- 2002 [192] Devettere, Raymond J. (2002): *Introduction to Virtue Ethics. Insights of the Ancient Greeks*, Washington, D. C.
- 2002 [193] Doris, John M. (2002): *Lack of Character. Personality and Moral Behavior*, Cambridge. – Vgl. dazu [127], [129], [180], [145], [150], [171], [121].
- 2002 [194] Driver, Julia (2002): Review of *On Virtue Ethics* by Rosalind Hursthouse, *Philosophical Review* 111, S. 122–27. – Zu
- 2002 [195] Hooker, Brad (2002): The Collapse of Virtue Ethics, *Utilitas* 14, S. 22–40. – Vgl. dazu [196].
- 2002 [196] Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002): Virtue Ethics vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker, *Utilitas* 14, S. 41–53. – Zu [195].
- 2002 [197] Kawall, Jason (2002): Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers, *Philosophical Studies* 109, S. 197–222.<sup>108</sup>

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pleasant. Conflict between an agent’s feelings and her actions, by contrast, is thought to indicate mere continence – a moral deficiency. This “harmony thesis” is generally taken to be a fundamental element of Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that the harmony thesis, understood this way, is mistaken, because there are occasions where a virtuous agent will find right action painful and difficult. What this means is that the generally accepted distinction between continence and virtue is unsupportable. This conclusion affects several well-known accounts of virtuous action, including those of Philippa Foot and John McDowell. A closer look at Aristotle, however, provides another way of distinguishing between continence and virtue, based in his categorization of goods as noble or base. I argue that virtue is exhibited when an agent’s feelings harmonize with his correct judgments of value, while discrepancies between feelings and correct judgments of value indicate continence. This understanding of continence and virtue enables us to accommodate the problem cases I raise.”

<sup>106</sup> “In the Stoics we find a combination of two perspectives which are commonly thought to conflict: the embedded perspective from within one’s social context, and the universal perspective of the member of the moral community of rational beings. I argue that the Stoics do have a unified theory, one which avoids problems that trouble some modern theories which try to unite these perspectives.”

<sup>107</sup> Inhalt: Vorbemerkung 7 Einleitung: Moralische Gefühle und Die Leichtigkeit des Seins 9 I. Menschliche Natur und Tugendethik 29 II. Skizze einer Theorie des Lasters 57 III. Vertrauen und Scham – Grundzüge einer Theorie moralischer Gefühle 65 IV. Evolution, Altruismus und Moral 82 V. Die Leidenschaft der Pädagogik 102 VI. Glück und Lebenslauf 115 VII. Humanontogenese und der Sinn des Lebens 128 VIII. Tugend und Charakter 143 IX. Die Tugenden 149 Gerechtigkeit 151 Mut 156 Mäßigung und Besonnenheit 167 Hoffnung 181 Glaube 197 Liebe 204 X. Freundschaft 241 XI. Tugend und demokratischer Charakter 258 XII. Toleranz – Tugend der Citoyens? 281 Bibliographische Notiz 287 Anmerkungen.

<sup>108</sup> “Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterization of right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would perform that action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-based

- 2002 [198] Kersting, Wolfgang (2002): *Kritik der Gleichheit. Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral*, Weilerswist, S. 217–54 („Zur Geschichte der Tugend“).
- 2002 [199] Luckner, Andreas (2002): Handlungen und Haltungen. Zur Renaissance der Tugendethik, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 50, S. 779–96.
- 2002 [200] Mayer, Verena (2002): Tugend und Gefühl, in *Die Moralität der Gefühle*, hrsg. von Sabine A. Döring und Verena Mayer, Berlin, S. 125–50.
- 2002 [201] Oderberg, David (2002): Review of Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, *Philosophical Books* 43 , S. 159–63.
- 2002 [202] Sreenivasan, Gopal (2002): Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution, *Mind* 111, S. 47–68.<sup>109</sup> – Zu [258], [239]. Vgl. dazu: [120].
- 2002 [203] Stohr, Karen /Wellman, Christopher Heath (2002): Recent Work on Virtue Ethics, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, S. 49–72.
- 2002 [204] Tännsjö, Torbjörn (2002): *Understanding Ethics. An Introduction to Moral Theory*, Edinburgh, S. 91–105 (“Virtue Ethics”).
- 2002 [205] Timmons, Mark (2002): *Moral Theory. An Introduction*, Lanham, S. 211–43 (“Virtue Ethics”).
- 2002 [206] van Zyl, Liezl (2002): Virtue Theory and Applied Ethics, *South African Journal of Philosophy* 21, S. 133–44.
- 2002 [207] Weber, Verena (2002): *Tugendethik und Kommunitarismus. Individualität, Universalisierung, Moralische Dilemmata*, Würzburg.<sup>110</sup>

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account of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawed because virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack of knowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based account according to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agent in a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observer would deem the action to be right (the belief to be justified).”

<sup>109</sup> “This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory – specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute this conclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data – the data themselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone’s character trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject’s own construal of the situation. Second, they include behaviour that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third, they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given these inadequacies in situationism’s operationalized conception of a ‘character trait’, I argue that situationism does not really address the proposition that people have ‘character traits’, properly understood. A fortiori, the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimental evidence in favour of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism.”

<sup>110</sup> „Der heutige Mensch steht im Spannungsfeld von zunehmender Individualisierung und fortschreitender Globalisierung. Ein funktionierendes Ethikmodell muß diesen neuen Bedingungen Rechnung tragen. Ansätze bieten in sehr ähnlicher Weise eine auf Aristoteles zurückgreifende Tugendethik und kommunitaristische Moralentwürfe. Doch beide, Kommunitarismus und Tugendethik, widersetzen sich

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oftmals gerade der Universalisierung. Die Vermittlung von Werten innerhalb einer überschaubaren Gemeinschaft steht im Vordergrund. Unterschiede zu anderen ethischen Auffassungen in anderen Gemeinschaften werden ohne weiteres akzeptiert. Können Tugendethik und Kommunitarismus somit wirklich eine tragfähige Basis für ein modernes Moralkonzept bieten? Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dieser zentralen Frage und prüft die Alltagstauglichkeit beider Ethikkonzepte anhand der in aktuellen Debatten diskutierten Phänomene, wie dem der moralischen Dilemmata. Es zeigt sich, daß die tugendethisch-kommunitaristische Denkrichtung hier interessante und neue Impulse geben kann.“

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<sup>111</sup> “This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity.”

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<sup>112</sup> “Synopsis: Out of the interplay between film criticism and a philosophical view of virtue, Joseph Kupfer argues that film fictions can be integral to moral reflection, and thus by examining the narrative and cinematic aspects of popular films, we can derive important moral truths about people and their behaviour. Taking as his base a classical conception of virtue and vice, Kupfer offers an in-depth examination of “Groundhog Day”, “The African Queen”, “Parenthood”, “Rob Roy”, “Fresh”, “Jaws” and “Aliens” in order to investigate the value of virtue within ever-widening social contexts.” (Amazon.co.uk)

<sup>113</sup> “Virtue ethics is standardly taught and discussed as a distinctive approach to the major questions of ethics, a third major position alongside Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. I argue that this taxonomy is a confusion. Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot possibly be a separate approach contrasted with those approaches. There are, to be sure, quite a few contemporary philosophical writers about virtue who are neither Utilitarians nor Kantians; many of these find inspiration in ancient Greek theories of virtue. But even here there is little unity. Although certain concerns do unite this disparate group (a concern for the role of motives and passions in good choice, a concern for character, and a concern for the whole course of an agent’s life), there are equally profound disagreements, especially concerning the role that reason should play in ethics. One group of modern virtue-theorists, I argue, are primarily anti-Utilitarians, concerned with the plurality of value and the susceptibility of passions to social cultivation. These theorists want to enlarge the place of reason in ethics. They hold that reason can deliberate about ends as well as means, and that reason can modify the passions themselves. Another group of virtue theorists are primarily anti-Kantians. They believe that reason plays too dominant a role in most philosophical accounts of ethics, and that a larger place should be given to sentiments and passions – which they typically construe in a less reason-based way than does the first group. The paper investigates these differences, concluding that it is not helpful to speak of “virtue ethics,” and that we would be better off characterizing the substantive views of each thinker – and then figuring out what we ourselves want to say.”

<sup>114</sup> “This paper is a detailed study of what are traditionally called the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. I defend what I call the Cardinality Thesis, that the traditional four and no others are cardinal. I define cardinality in terms of three sub-theses, the first being that the cardinal virtues are jointly necessary for the possession of every other virtue, the second that each of the other virtues is a species of one of the four cardinals, and the third that many of the other virtues are also auxiliaries of one or more cardinals. I provide abstract arguments for each sub-thesis, followed by illustration from concrete cases. I then use these results to shed light on the two fundamental problems of the acquisition of the virtues and their unity, proving some further theses in the latter case.”

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<sup>115</sup> The author, [Machan@Chapman.edu](mailto:Machan@Chapman.edu), 1 October, 1997: “The virtue of generosity is a spontaneous, though rationally cultivated, disposition of persons to extend their help to others who can use and deserve it. As with other virtues, generosity presupposes that persons can make free choices as to how they will act. Its full flourishing in a community requires, furthermore, that the rights to liberty of action are fully respected and protected. Contending, as some do, that generous conduct may be elicited by coercive measures or prohibitions laid down against trade – e.g., so as to encourage blood donations – is wrongheaded. Coerced “generosity” is not virtuous and removing the option to trade also does violence to the conditions required for virtuous generosity. In their eagerness to provide for the needy, some thinkers make public policy proposals that destroy the human capacity for virtuous generosity. Only if men and women are left free – that is, if they live in civil society – can they be expected to act as they should, including generously, when that is appropriate.” (Amazon.co.uk)

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<sup>116</sup> “Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, I propose a virtue ethics which does not suffer from the problem. Traits are not virtues because their cultivation and manifestation promote a value such as agent flourishing. They are virtues in so far as they are habits of appropriate response (which may be of various types) to various relevant values (valuable things, etc.). This means that there is a direct connection between the rationale of a virtue and what makes an action virtuous or right.”

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<sup>117</sup> “Feelings of guilt have a role to play in moral philosophy as a link between the ethics of virtue and duty. They allow for a notion of imperfect virtue as something still achievable despite serious moral lapses in the past. They also would seem to be required by perfect virtue in response to a moral dilemma. The defense of guilt in a case of dilemma has implications for virtue ethics insofar as it yields a distinction between an agent's character and his record of moral action--and an asymmetrical justificatory treatment of guilt versus other-directed variants of emotional blame.”

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<sup>118</sup> “The project in this paper is to argue for an ordinal account of the unity of the virtues in the following three steps: (1) The first is to show the importance of a neglected class of questions about coherence – questions that may be referred to as coincidence problems. It is important to see that even if a virtue theory can eliminate conflicts between traits, a large class of difficult practical problems is very likely to remain: namely, the problems that arise when two or more traits give the same guidance for conduct, but when we think only one of the traits should be controlling. (“Yes of course I wanted you to keep the promise. But because you wanted to, not because it was your duty.”) Call these cases coincidence problems. Love and duty often coincide for practical purposes – as often, probably, as they conflict. And the same is true of prudence and duty, and prudence and love. An account of the unity of the virtues that solves all the conflict problems but leaves these coincidence problems untouched is inadequate. Part of the agenda in this paper is to show that traditional accounts of the unity of the virtues are inadequate in just this way. (2) The second step in the argument is to organize conventional accounts of the unity of the virtues in a perspicuous way, and to show that they fail to solve coincidence problems. Arguments for the unity of the virtues typically do one of three things. a) One of these is to argue for the identity of the virtues: to argue that they are, at bottom, all the very same thing – a perfectly seamless whole in which there are ultimately no separate elements, and hence no conflicts or overlaps. b) A second sort of proposal is to argue for the organic unity of the virtues: to argue that they are all mutually compatible and connected parts of a whole – a perfectly harmonious whole in which, though there are genuinely distinct elements, there are no genuine conflicts. c) And a third strategy is to argue for the ordinal unity of the virtues: to argue that they are a perfectly ordered whole, unified in the sense that, given any conflict between traits, it will always be possible in theory to determine which one is primary -- which one is the “first virtue” in that circumstance. (3) The third step is to describe the sorts of ordinal accounts that are available, sketching the outlines of one organized around practical wisdom, and indicating how it would handle coherence questions of all sorts, including those of coincidence.”

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<sup>119</sup> “Modern moral philosophy has generally neglected the concept of virtue as one which should be central to moral theorizing. Some reasons for the neglect are mentioned; some sources of regret for the neglect are explained; and six illustrations of the usefulness of the concept of virtue in moral theorizing are developed in more detail: 1) On defining the good person; 2) On defining standards of performance; 3) On excuses; 4) On rescue vs preventive action; 5) On civil disobedience; 6) On torture, terrorism and strategic bombing. The point of the paper is not to argue that the concept of virtue should supplant the concepts of duty and

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value, but merely to show that there are good reasons for regretting its neglect, and good reasons for encouraging its development.” (<http://www.wm.edu/CAS/PHIL/Becker/lcb-bib.htm>)