

20.09.2023

Literatur zum Regelkonsequentialismus

Bibliography on Rule-Consequentialism

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order:

<http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/brc.pdf>

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order:

<http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/crc.pdf>

- 2005 [1] Arneson, Richard (2005): Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections, *Philosophical Issues* 15 (1), 235–251. – Dazu: [30].
- 2001 [2] Audi, Robert (2001): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Utilitas* 13, S. 357–59.
- 2007 [3] Brand-Ballard, Jeffrey (2007): Why One Basic Principle?, *Utilitas* 19, S. 220–242.¹
- 2007 [4] Card, Robert F. (2007): Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialism, *Utilitas* 19, S. 243–58.² – Dazu: [33].

¹ “Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. In *Ideal Code, Real World* (Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker’s arguments have drawn powerful criticisms from pluralists such as Alan Thomas, Phillip Montague and Philip Stratton-Lake. Against these critics, I argue that Hooker’s monism enjoys certain practical advantages associated with the simplicity of a single basic principle. These advantages are often overlooked because they appear primarily in cases of second-order deliberation, in which one must decide whether our basic moral duties support a certain derivative duty. I argue that these advantages of monism over pluralism are analogous to the advantages that generalists claim over moral particularism. Because pluralists are generalists, I conclude that they are in an awkward dialectical position to dismiss Hooker’s monism for the reasons they usually offer.”

² “Rule-consequentialism is frequently regarded as problematic since it faces the following powerful dilemma: either rule-consequentialism collapses into act-consequentialism or rule-consequentialism is inconsistent. Recent defenders of this theory such as Brad Hooker provide a careful response to this objection. By explicating the nature and theoretical commitments of rule-consequentialism, I contend that these maneuvers are not successful by offering a new way of viewing the dilemma which retains its force even in light of these recent discussions. The central idea is that even the most well-developed contemporary form of the view is ensnared in the following dilemma: as an agent-neutral consequentialist

- 2001 [5] Carlson, Erik (2001): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Theoria* 67, S. 268–72.
- 1991 [6] Carson, Thomas L. (1991): A Note on Hooker’s “Rule Consequentialism”, *Mind* 100, S. 117–21. – Dazu: [16].
- 2020 [7] Copp, David (2020): The Rule Worship and Idealization Objections Revisited and Resisted, in *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* 10, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 131–55.
- 2011 [8] Cowen, Tyler (2011): Rule Consequentialism Makes Sense After All, *Social Philosophy and Policy* 28, S. 212–31.
- 2015 [9] Cureton, Adam (2015): Making Room for Rules, *Philosophical Studies* 172, S. 737–59.³
- 2002 [10] Driver, Julia (2002): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2002.06.03, <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1136>.
- 2007 [11] Eggleston, Ben (2007): Conflicts of Rules in Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialism, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 37, S. 329–50.
- 2016 [12] Galvão, Pedro (2016): Rule-Consequentialism and the Significance of Species, *Utilitas* 28, S. 396–414.⁴ – Dazu: [72].
- 2003 [13] Harris, George W. (2003): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Ethics* 113, S. 882–85.
- 2000 [14] Haslett, D. W. (2000): Values, Obligations, and Saving Lives, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 71–104.
- 1990 [15] Hooker, Brad (1990): Rule-Consequentialism, *Mind* 99, S. 67–77. Wiederabgedruckt in *Character and Conduct*, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, 5. Auflage, Belmont, CA, 2006.
- 1991 [16] Hooker, Brad (1991): Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson, *Mind* 100, S. 269–76. – Zu [6].

theory, rule-consequentialism is either inconsistent or it is desperately unmotivated as a form of consequentialism since it is committed to a non-consequentialist form of ultimate moral value.”

³ “Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a priori requirements that cannot be tailored to human foibles and limitations. I argue that Kantian moral theories should incorporate public moral rules as mid-level moral requirements for embodied and socially embedded human agents. I explain how certain specific moral judgments about how we ought to act are justified by public moral rules, which are themselves justified by more fundamental moral requirements.”

⁴ “According to rule-consequentialism, we ought to follow the principles that would result in the best consequences if they were generally accepted. These principles constitute the ideal code. My aim is to make clear what the ideal code says about what we owe to animals. I argue that it accords moral status to them: the rule-consequentialist should acknowledge both general duties and special obligations to animals. However, in the ideal code there is no place for animal rights, conceived as deontological constraints. Within the animal rights debate, I conclude, rule-consequentialism is superior to some of the most prominent ethical theories in its agreement with widely shared moral intuitions. But some of its practical implications regarding the proper treatment of animals remain unclear. This point is illustrated by a discussion of what Jeff McMahan called ‘benign carnivorousness’.”

- 1994 [17] Hooker, Brad (1994): Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck?, *Analysis* 54, S. 92–97.
- 1995 [18] Hooker, Brad (1995): Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 95, S. 19–35
- 1996 [19] Hooker, Brad (1996): Ross-Style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism, *Mind* 105, S. 531–552. – Dazu: [91].
- 1997 [20] Hooker, Brad (1997): Reply to Stratton-Lake, *Mind* 106, S. 759f. – Zu [91].
- 1998 [21] Hooker, Brad (1998): Rule-Consequentialism and Obligations Toward the Needy, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 79, S. 19–33.
- 1999 [22] Hooker, Brad (1999): Sacrificing for the Good of Strangers – Repeatedly, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59, S. 177–81.
- 2000 [23] Hooker, Brad (2000): Rule-Consequentialism, in *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, hrsg. von Hugh LaFollette, Oxford, S. 183–204.
- 2000 [24] Hooker, Brad (2000): Impartiality, Predictability, and Indirect Consequentialism, in *Well-Being and Morality. Essays in Honour of James Griffin*, hrsg. von Roger Crisp und Brad Hooker, Oxford, S. 129–42.
- 2000 [25] Hooker, Brad (2000): Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 222–38.
- 2000 [26] Hooker, Brad (2000): *Ideal Code, Real World. A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality*, Oxford.
- 2002 [27] Hooker, Brad (2002): Intuitions and Moral Theorizing, in *Ethical Intuitionism. Re-evaluations*, hrsg. von Philip Stratton-Lake, Oxford, S. 161–83.
- 2002 [28] Hooker, Brad (2002): The Collapse of Virtue Ethics, *Utilitas* 14, S. 22–40. – Dazu: [42].
- 2003 [29] Hooker, Brad (2003): Rule-consequentialism, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, hrsg. von Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/>.
- 2005 [30] Hooker, Brad (2005): Reply to Arneson and McIntyre, *Philosophical Issues* 15 (1), 264–281. – Zu [1] und [55].
- 2006 [31] Hooker, Brad (2006): Feldman, Rule-consequentialism, and Desert, in *The Good, the Right, Life and Death. Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman*, hrsg. von Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Richard Feldman und Michael J. Zimmerman, Aldershot, S. 103–14.
- 2006 [32] Hooker, Brad (2006): Right, Wrong, and Rule-Consequentialism, in *The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism*, hrsg. von Henry R. West, Oxford, S. 233–48.
- 2007 [33] Hooker, Brad (2007): Rule-consequentialism and Internal Consistency: A Reply to Card, *Utilitas* 19, S. 514–519.⁵ – Zu [4].
- 2008 [34] Hooker, Brad (2008): Rule-consequentialism versus Act-consequentialism, *Notizie di Politeia* 24, S. 75–85.

⁵ “Rule-consequentialism has been accused of either collapsing into act-consequentialism or being internally inconsistent. I have tried to develop a form of rule-consequentialism without these flaws. In this June’s issue of *Utilitas*, Robert Card argued that I have failed. Here I assess his arguments.”

- 2011 [35] Hooker, Brad (2011): Promises and Rule-Consequentialism, in *Promises and Agreements. Philosophical Essays*, hrsg. von Hanoch Sheinman, Oxford, S. 237–54.⁶
- 2014 [36] Hooker, Brad (2014): Acts or Rules? The Fine-tuning of Utilitarianism, in *God, the Good, and Utilitarianism. Perspectives on Peter Singer*, hrsg. von John Perry, Cambridge, S. 125–38.
- 2014 [37] Hooker, Brad (2014): Must Kantian Contractualism and Rule-consequentialism Converge?, *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* 4, S. 34–52.
- 2020 [38] Hooker, Brad (2020): The Role(s) of Rules in Consequentialist Ethics, in *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*, hrsg. von Douglas Portmore, Oxford, S. 441–62.⁷
- 2008 [39] Hooker, Brad/Fletcher, Guy (2008): Variable versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism, *Philosophical Quarterly* 58, S. 344–52.⁸ – Zu [83].
- 2000 [40] Hooker, Brad/Mason, Elinor/Miller, Dale E. (Hrsg.) (2000): *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, Edinburgh.
- 1993 [41] Howard-Snyder, Frances (1993): Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 30, S. 271–78.
- 2002 [42] Hursthouse, Rosalind (2002): Virtue Ethics vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker,

⁶ “The duty to keep promises has many aspects associated with deontological moral theories. The duty to keep promises is non-welfarist, in that the obligation to keep a promise need not be conditional on there being a net benefit from keeping the promise—indeed need not be conditional on there being at least someone who would benefit from its being kept. The duty to keep promises is more closely connected to autonomy than directly to welfare: agents have moral powers to give themselves certain obligations to others. And these moral powers, which enable promisors to create agent-relative obligations to promisees, correlate with rights the promisees acquire in the process, such as rights to waive the duty or insist on its performance. As a result of promises, promisees acquire (not only rights but also) a special status: the promisees are the ones wronged when promises to them that they have not waived are not kept. One more aspect of the duty to keep promises that is associated with deontological moral theories is that what actions the duty requires is at least partly backward-looking: what actions the duty requires depends on facts about the past, namely facts about what promises were made and then waived or not. This paper surveys these aspects of the duty to keep promises and then explores whether rule-consequentialism can be reconciled with them.”

⁷ “After preliminaries concerning different accounts of the good and the distinction between actual-consequence consequentialism and expected-value consequentialism, this paper explains why consequentialists should prescribe a moral decision procedure dominated by rules. However, act consequentialists deny rules have a role in the criterion of moral rightness. But prescribing a decision procedure dominated by rules and then denying rules a role in the criterion of moral rightness seems problematic. Rule consequentialism gives rules roles first in the decision procedure agents should use and second in the criterion of moral rightness. But giving rules this second role has attracted objections, some of which are outlined and answered here. The final section of the paper considers some recent developments.”

⁸ “Fixed-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism evaluate rules in terms of the expected net value of one particular level of social acceptance, but one far enough below 100% social acceptance to make salient the complexities created by partial compliance. Variable-rate versions of rule-consequentialism and rule-utilitarianism instead evaluate rules in terms of their expected net value at all different levels of social acceptance. Brad Hooker has advocated a fixed-rate version. Michael Ridge has argued that the variable-rate version is better. The debate continues here. Of particular interest is the difference between the implications of Hooker’s and Ridge’s rules about doing good for others.”

- 2017 [43] Kaczmarek, Patrick (2017): How Much is Rule-Consequentialism Really Willing to Give Up to Save the Future of Humanity, *Utilitas* 29, S. 239–49.⁹
- 2000 [44] Kagan, Shelly (2000): Evaluative Focal Points, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 134–55.
- 2012 [45] Kahn, Leonard (2012): Rule Consequentialism and Scope, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 15, S. 631–41.¹⁰
- 2013 [46] Kahn, Leonard (2013): Rule Consequentialism and Disasters, *Philosophical Studies* 162, S. 219–36.¹¹
- 1999 [47] Law, Iain (1999): Rule-Consequentialism’s Dilemma, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 2, S. 263–76.
- 2004 [48] Lawlor, Rob (2004): Hooker’s Ideal Code and the Sacrifice Problem, *Social Theory and Practice* 30, S. 583–88.
- 2010 [49] Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de/Singer, Peter (2010): Secrecy In Consequentialism: A Defence of Esoteric Morality, *Ratio* 23, S. 34–58: S. 44–51.¹² – Vgl. dazu: Hooker, Publicity In Morality: A Reply to Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, *Ratio* 23, S. 111–17.

⁹ “Brad Hooker argues that the cost of inculcating in everyone the prevent disaster rule places a limit on its demandingness. My aim in this article is show that this is not true of existential risk reduction. However, this does not spell trouble for the reason that removing persistent global harms significantly improves our long-run chances of survival. We can expect things to get better, not worse, for our population.”

¹⁰ “Rule consequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by an ideal moral code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. But just how many moral codes are there supposed to be? Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior because it accommodates our convictions about costless benefits. Some have charged that Relative RC threatens our convictions about the generality of moral codes and that it leads inevitably to what Brad Hooker calls “runaway relativism.” I argue that Relative RC has principled reasons for stopping this imagined slide down the slippery slope.”

¹¹ “Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A’s doing F in C is in accordance with the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous results. Though some rule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker’s suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from non-disasters.”

- 2003 [50] Lenman, James (2003): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World*, *Philosophical Books* 44, S. 181–83.
- 2000 [51] Levy, Sanford S. (2000): The Educational Equivalence of Act and Rule Utilitarianism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 27–39.
- 2013 [52] Levy, Sanford S. (2013): A Contractualist Defense of Rule Consequentialism, *Journal of Philosophical Research* 38, S. 189–201.
- 2014 [53] Levy, Sanford S. (2014): The Failure of Hooker’s Argument for Rule Consequentialism, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 11, S. 598–614.¹³
- 2000 [54] Lyons, David (2000): The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 105–20.
- 2005 [55] McIntyre, Alison (2005): The Perils of Holism: Brad Hooker’s *Ideal Code, Real World*, *Philosophical Issues* 15 (1), 252–263. – Dazu: [30].
- 2000 [56] Miller, Dale E. (2000): Hooker’s Use and Abuse of Reflective Equilibrium, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 156–78.
- 2014 [57] Miller, Dale E. (2014): Rule Utilitarianism, in *The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism*, hrsg. von Ben Eggleston und Dale E. Miller, Cambridge, S. 146–65.
- 2021 [58] Miller, Dale E. (2021): Moral Education and Rule Consequentialism, *Philosophical Quarterly* 71, S. 120–40.¹⁴

¹² “Sidgwick’s defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams’s condemnation of it as ‘Government House utilitarianism.’ It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T. M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makes it possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications.”

¹³ “Brad Hooker argues for rule consequentialism using narrow reflective equilibrium resources along with a handful of wider resources. One of his important claims in defense of rule consequentialism is that it begins from a familiar and attractive idea about morality. I argue that his defense of rule consequentialism fails and more particularly, that rather than beginning from a familiar and attractive idea, it begins from an idea that is quite unattractive. I show this by applying the method rule consequentialists use to derive moral advice for the real world to non-moral cases where its unattractiveness is clear. I then argue that the basic idea behind rule consequentialism is attractive if considered as an account of moral reform, in so far as the account of moral reform can be divorced from one’s account of right and wrong, something that occurs in theories like that of Stephen Toulmin.”

¹⁴ “Rule consequentialism holds that an actions’ moral standing depends on its relation to the moral code whose general adoption would have the best consequences. Heretofore rule consequentialists have understood the notion of a code’s being generally adopted in terms of its being generally obeyed or, more commonly, its being generally accepted. I argue that these ways of understanding general adoption lead to unacceptable formulations of the theory. For instance, Brad Hooker, Michael Ridge, and Holly Smith have recently offered different answers to the question of what ‘acceptance rate’ we should build into our formulation of rule consequentialism, and all are unsatisfactory. I argue instead for a novel approach to

- 2009 [59] Miller, Richard B. (2009): Actual Rule Utilitarianism, *Journal of Philosophy* 106, S. 5–28.
- 2016 [60] Miller, Timothy D. (2016): Solving Rule-Consequentialism’s Acceptance Rate Problem, *Utilitas* 28, S. 41–53.¹⁵
- 2021 [61] Miller, Timothy D. (2021): From Compliance, to Acceptance, to Teaching: On Relocating Rule Consequentialism’s Stipulations. *Utilitas* 33, S. 204–20.¹⁶
- 2000 [62] Montague, Phillip (2000): Why Rule Consequentialism is not Superior to Ross-style Pluralism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 203–11.
- 2002 [63] Moore, Andrew (2002): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80, S. 113f.
- 2022 [64] Mosquera, Julia (2022): Rule-Consequentialism, Procreative Freedom and Future Generations, *Ratio* 35, S. 333–43.¹⁷

formulating rule consequentialism, ‘uniform-moral-education’ rule consequentialism, on which what it means for a moral code to be generally adopted is not for it to be generally *followed* or generally *accepted*, but instead for it to be generally *taught*.”

¹⁵ “Recent formulations of rule-consequentialism (RC) have attempted to select the ideal moral code based on realistic assumptions of imperfect acceptance. But this introduces further problems. What assumptions about acceptance would be realistic? And what criterion should we use to identify the ideal code? The solutions suggested in the recent literature – Fixed Rate RC, Variable Rate RC, Optimum Rate RC and Maximizing Expectation Rate RC – all calculate a code’s value using formulas that *stipulate* some *uniform* rate(s) of acceptance. After pointing out a number of difficulties with these approaches, I introduce a formulation of RC on which *non-uniform* acceptance rates are *calculated* rather than *stipulated*. In addition to making more realistic assumptions about acceptance rates, *Calculated Rates RC* has several other advantages: it gives equal consideration to both *acceptance* and *compliance* rates and it brings RC more in line with our intuitive ways of thinking about rules and their consequences.”

¹⁶ “Several recent formulations of Rule Consequentialism (RC) have broken with the consensus that RC should be formulated in terms of code acceptance, claiming instead that RC should focus on the consequences of codes’ being taught. I begin this article with an examination of the standard case for acceptance formulations. In addition to depending on the mistaken assumption that compliance and acceptance formulations are the only options, the standard case claims advantages for acceptance formulations that, upon closer examination, favor teaching formulations. In the remainder of the article, I defend this new teaching-centered approach against some recent criticisms. I argue that preoccupation with the somewhat technical problem of identifying the best criterion for making choices under conditions of uncertainty has distracted rule consequentialists from paying more careful attention to the advantages and disadvantages that result from decisions concerning where they locate RC’s stipulated assumptions within the theory.”

¹⁷ “In this paper I analyse how procreative freedom poses a challenge for rule-consequentialism. First, I reconstruct the rule-consequentialist case for procreative freedom. Second, I argue that population scenarios resulting from very low fertility pose a problem for rule-consequentialism since such scenarios cannot secure population growth or even avoid human extinction in the long run. Third, I argue that population scenarios resulting from excessive procreation also pose a problem for rule-consequentialism since they are incompatible with the promotion of optimific consequences in various ways. Were the rule-consequentialist to avoid these types of scenarios, the challenge would consist in doing so while retaining the liberal approach to individual rights and freedoms that made rule-consequentialism an advantageous competitor against moral theories like act-consequentialism. These population scenarios raise more general questions about how rule-consequentialism ought to conceptualise the application of universal rules in the long-term,

- 1994 [65] Mulgan, Tim (1994): Rule Consequentialism and Famine, *Analysis* 54, S. 187.
- 1996 [66] Mulgan, Tim (1996): One False Virtue of Rule Consequentialism, and One New Vice, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 77, S. 362ff.
- 2000 [67] Mulgan, Tim (2000): Ruling Out Rule Consequentialism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 212–21.
- 2001 [68] Mulgan, Tim (2001): *The Demands of Consequentialism*, Oxford, S. 58–67, 75f., 77–82, 97f.
- 2002 [69] Mulgan, Tim (2002): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World*, *Philosophical Quarterly* 52, S. 418–20.
- 2009 [70] Mulgan, Tim (2009): Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity, in *Harming Future Persons. Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem*, hrsg. von Melinda A. Roberts und David T. Wasserman, Dordrecht, S. 115–34.
- 2022 [71] Mulgan, Tim (2022): From Brad to Worse. Rule-Consequentialism and Undesirable Futures, *Ratio* 35, S. 275–88.¹⁸
- 2019 [72] Paez, Eze (2019): On the Importance of Species for Rule-Consequentialism. A Reply to Galvao, *Utilitas* 31, S. 396–414. – Zu [12].
- 2016 [73] Paulo, Norbert (2016): *The Confluence of Philosophy and Law in Applied Ethics*, London, S. 217–35 (“Brad Hooker’s Rule Consequentialism”).
- 2008 [74] Pellegrino, Gianfranco (2008): Some Old Objections to Rule-Consequentialism Reconsidered: The Case of Reproductive Freedom, *Notizie di Politeia* 24, S. 98–107.
- 2021 [75] Perl, Caleb (2021): Solving the Ideal Worlds Problem, *Ethics* 132, S. 89–126.¹⁹
- 2001 [76] Pettit, Philip (2001): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World*, *Times Literary Supplement* 5139, S. 28.
- 2000 [77] Pettit, Philip/Smith, Michael (2000): Global Consequentialism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 121–133.

intergenerational context. This is an important place for inquiry given that rule-consequentialism is originally conceived as a forward- looking theory.”

¹⁸ “This paper asks how rule-consequentialism might adapt to very adverse futures, and whether moderate liberal consequentialism can survive into broken futures and/or futures where humanity faces imminent extinction. The paper first recaps the recent history of rule-consequentialist proactive ethics. It outlines rule-consequentialism, extends it to cover future people, and applies it to broken futures. The paper then introduces a new thought experiment—the “ending world”—where humanity faces an extinction that is unavoidable and imminent, but not immediate. The paper concludes by explaining why this thought experiment challenges rule-consequentialism’s commitment to proactive liberty, and briefly asking how rule-consequentialism might respond to that challenge.”

¹⁹ “I introduce a new formulation of rule consequentialism, defended as an improvement on traditional formulations. My new formulation cleanly avoids what Parfit calls “ideal world” objections. I suggest that those objections arise because traditional formulations incorporate counterfactual comparisons about how things could go differently. My new formulation eliminates those counterfactual comparisons. Part of the interest of the new formulation is as a model of how to reformulate structurally similar views, including various kinds of contractualism.”

- 2018 [78] Podgorski, Abelard (2018): Wouldn't it be Nice? Moral Rules and Distant Worlds, *Noûs* 52, S. 279–94.²⁰
- 2009 [79] Portmore, Douglas W. (2009): Rule-Consequentialism and Irrelevant Others, *Utilitas* 21, S. 368–76.²¹
- 2017 [80] Portmore, Douglas W. (2017): Parfit on Reasons and Rule Consequentialism, in: *Reading Parfit On What Matters*, hrsg. von Simon Kirchin, Abingdon, S. 135–52. (S. 224–30: Parfit: Response to Douglas W. Portmore).
- 2000 [81] Powers, Madison (2000): Rule Consequentialism and the Value of Friendship, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 239–56.
- 2016 [82] Rajczi, Alex (2016): On the Incoherence Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 19, S. 857–76.²²
- 2006 [83] Ridge, Michael (2006): Introducing Variable-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism, *Philosophical Quarterly* 56, S. 242–53.²³ – Vgl. dazu [39].

²⁰ “Traditional rule consequentialism faces a problem sometimes called the *ideal world objection*—the worry that by looking only at the consequences in worlds where rules are universally adhered to, the theory fails to account for problems that arise because adherence to rules in the real world is inevitably imperfect. In response, recent theorists have defended sophisticated versions of rule consequentialism which are sensitive to the consequences in worlds with less utopian levels of adherence. In this paper, I argue that these attempts underestimate the problem they are designed to avoid—the worry about ideal worlds is only one manifestation of a deeper and more general problem, the *distant world objection*, which threatens not only the sophisticated revisions of rule consequentialism, but any view which determines what we ought to do by evaluating worlds that differ from ours in more than what is up to us.”

²¹ “In this article, I argue that Brad Hooker’s rule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect.”

²² “For a long time many philosophers felt the incoherence objection was a decisive objection to rule-consequentialism, but that position has recently become less secure, because Brad Hooker has offered a clever new way for rule-consequentialists to avoid the incoherence objection. Hooker’s response defeats traditional forms of the incoherence objection, but this paper argues that another version of the problem remains. Several possible solutions fail. One other does not, but it introduces other problems into the theory. I conclude that the new incoherence objection still poses a major challenge to rule-consequentialism, though not for the reasons usually assumed. It does not constitute a fatal objection to rule-consequentialism but instead highlights a theoretical drawback in the theory which must be taken into account during a more holistic evaluation of rule-consequentialism and its rivals.”

²³ “The basic idea of rule-utilitarianism is that right action should be defined in terms of what would be required by rules which would maximize either actual or expected utility if those rules gained general acceptance, or perhaps general compliance. Rule-utilitarians face a dilemma. They must characterize ‘general acceptance’ either as 100% acceptance, or as something less. On the first horn of the dilemma, rule-utilitarianism is vulnerable to the charge of utopianism; on the second, it is open to the charge of arbitrariness and lack of philosophical depth. I press this objection, and develop and defend an alternative version of rule-utilitarianism which can evade the dilemma. I call this new version ‘variable-rate rule-utilitarianism’.”

- 2000 [84] Riley, Jonathan (2000): Defending Rule Utilitarianism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 40–70.
- 2004 [85] Schroth, Jörg (2004): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 7, S. 91–94.
- 2022 [86] Schroth, Jörg (2022): *Konsequentialismus. Einführung*, Baden-Baden, S. 133–38 (“Regelkonsequentialismus”).
- 2001 [87] Shaw, William H. (2001): Review of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Mind* 110, S. 1074–77.
- 2019 [88] Sin, William (2019): Confucianism, Rule-Consequentialism, and the Demands of Filial Obligations, *Journal of Religious Ethics* 47, S. 377–93.²⁴
- 2006 [89] Skorupski, John (2006): Welfare and Self-Governance, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9, S. 289–309: S. 298–301.²⁵
- 2010 [90] Smith, Holly M. (2010): Measuring the Consequences of Rules, *Utilitas* 22, S. 413–433.²⁶ – Dazu: [105].
- 1997 [91] Stratton-Lake, Philip (1997): Can Hooker’s Rule-Consequentialist Principle Justify Ross’s Prima Facie Duties?, *Mind* 106, S. 151–58. – Zu [19]. Dazu: [20].
- 2008 [92] Suikkanen, Jussi (2008): A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism, *Philosophia* 36, S. 141–50.²⁷

²⁴ “Why should I take care of my aging parents? How far will morality require me to sacrifice for this cause? I will study these questions from the perspectives of Confucianism and rule-consequentialism. Confucians believe that the continuity of families and the interactions between members of different generations can enhance the integrity of society in the long run. However, since Confucianism may impose extreme demands on its followers, this theory may be problematic. In this paper, I argue that despite its demands, the Confucian doctrines are defensible and are worth upholding. To explain my view, I draw upon rule-consequentialism and explain how the rule-consequentialist analysis complements and enhances the Confucian claims. I believe that the consequentialist conception of confucianism can provide a useful resource for responding to the moral challenge of population aging in the current state of the world.”

²⁵ “Two ideas have dominated ethical thought since the time of Bentham and Kant. One is utilitarianism, the other is an idea of moral agency as self-governance. Utilitarianism says that morality must somehow subserve welfare, self-governance says that it must be graspable directly by individual moral insight. But these ideas seem to war with one another. Can we eliminate the apparent conflict by a careful review of what is plausible in the two ideas? In seeking an answer to this question I examine (1) the implications of welfarism, (2) the nature of moral obligation (3) the nature of our moral knowledge.”

²⁶ “Recently two distinct forms of rule-utilitarianism have been introduced that differ on how to measure the consequences of rules. Brad Hooker advocates fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism (which measures the expected value of the rule’s consequences at a 90 percent acceptance rate), while Michael Ridge advocates variable-rate rule-utilitarianism (which measures the average expected value of the rule’s consequences for all different levels of social acceptance). I argue that both of these are inferior to a new proposal, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism. According to optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, an ideal code is the code whose *optimum* acceptance level is no lower than that of any alternative code. I then argue that all three forms of rule-utilitarianism fall prey to two fatal problems that leave us without any viable form of rule-utilitarianism.”

²⁷ “Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the rule-

- 2022 [93] Suikkanen, Jussi (2022): Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism and Scanlon's Contractualism. A Re-Evaluation, *Ratio* 35, S. 261–74.²⁸
- 2000 [94] Thomas, Alan (2000): Consequentialism and the Subversion of Pluralism, in *Morality, Rules, and Consequences. A Critical Reader*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason und Dale E. Miller, Edinburgh, S. 179–202.
- 2004 [95] Timmons, Mark (2004): Critical Notice of Hooker, *Ideal Code, Real World, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 69, S. 240–43.
- 2013 [96] Tobia, Kevin (2013): Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 16, S. 643–52.²⁹
- 2018 [97] Tobia, Kevin (2018): Rule-Consequentialism's Assumptions, *Utilitas* 30, S. 458–71.³⁰
- 2016 [98] Toppinen, Teemu (2016): Rule Consequentialism (and Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates, *Philosophical Quarterly* 66, S. 122–35.³¹

consequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.”

²⁸ “Brad Hooker’s rule-consequentialism and T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism have been some of the most debated ethical theories in normative ethics during the last twenty years or so. This article suggests that these theories can be compared at two levels. Firstly, what are the deep, structural differences between the rule-consequentialist and contractualist frameworks in which Hooker and Scanlon formulate their views? Secondly, what are the more superficial differences between Hooker’s and Scanlon’s formulations of these theories? Based on exploring these questions and several purported differences between Hooker’s and Scanlon’s views, this article argues that, at the structural level, the two theories are more similar than previous recognised. It suggests that there is only one candidate for a deeper difference and even it may not be that significant. This insight sheds new light on both contractualism and rule-consequentialism, and it will also help us to formulate better versions of the views.”

²⁹ “Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing Expectation Rate Rule Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems.”

³⁰ “Rule-Consequentialism faces ‘the problem of partial acceptance’: How should the ideal code be selected given the possibility that its rules may not be universally accepted? A new contender, ‘Calculated Rates’ Rule-Consequentialism claims to solve this problem. However, I argue that Calculated Rates merely relocates the partial acceptance question. Nevertheless, there is a significant lesson from this failure of Calculated Rates. Rule-Consequentialism’s problem of partial acceptance is more helpfully understood as an instance of the broader problem of selecting the ideal code given various assumptions – assumptions about who will accept and comply with the rules, but also about how the rules will be taught and enforced, and how similar the future will be. Previous rich discussions about partial acceptance provide a taxonomy and groundwork for formulating the best version of Rule-Consequentialism.”

- 2021 [99] Tuckness, Alex (2021): *Morality as Legislation. Rules and Consequences*, Cambridge.³²
- 2009 [100] Wall, Edmund (2009): Hooker's Consequentialism and the Depth of Moral Experience, *Dialogue* 48, S. 337–51.³³
- 2016 [101] Wolf, Susan (2016): Two Concepts of Rule Utilitarianism, in *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* 6, hrsg. von Mark Timmons, Oxford, S. 123–44.
- 2008 [102] Woodard, Christopher (2008): A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11, S. 247–61.³⁴
- 2022 [103] Woodard, Christopher (2022): Reasons for Rule Consequentialists, *Ratio* 35, S. 251–60.³⁵

³¹ “According to one form of rule consequentialism, RC, everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance would make things go best. According to one form of Kantian contractualism, KC, everyone ought to follow the rules whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. RC and KC are almost universally rejected on the basis of their appealing to universal acceptance rate. I argue that given the inclusion, into our value theory, of what Philip Pettit calls ‘robustly demanding goods’, RC and KC probably survive the most important objections of the relevant kind: the New Ideal World Objection and the Objection from Reprobates and Amoralists. If RC and KC can survive these objections, this is good news for those sympathetic to rule consequentialism and Kantian contractualism, as the alternative formulations of these views, which appeal to lower or variable acceptance rates, are widely agreed to face severe problems of their own.”

³² “‘What would happen if everyone acted that way?’ This question is often used in everyday moral assessments, but it has a paradoxical quality: it draws not only on Kantian ideas of a universal moral law but also on consequentialist claims that what is right depends on the outcome. In this book, Alex Tuckness examines how the question came to be seen as paradoxical, tracing its history from the theistic approaches of the seventeenth century to the secular accounts of the present. Tuckness shows that the earlier interpretations were hybrid theories that included both consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements, and argues that contemporary uses of this approach will likewise need to combine consequentialist and non-consequentialist commitments.”

³³ “In *Ideal Code, Real World*, Brad Hooker seeks to offer a version of ideal rule consequentialism that is immune from standard criticisms. I will attempt to challenge Hooker's ideal rule-consequentialist theory by arguing that there are philosophical problems at the ultimate foundation of his maximizing consequentialist and pluralist approach toward well-being and other basic goods. I find that no amount of revision is likely to insulate his approach from standard criticisms. I suggest that any maximizing rule-consequentialist approach toward well-being, taken in a rich and pluralist sense, is likely to fall prey to standard criticisms. In later work, Hooker drops ideal rule consequentialism in favor of an incremental rule-consequentialist approach. That piecemeal approach is also challenged in this paper.”

³⁴ “We best understand Rule Consequentialism as a theory of pattern-based reasons, since it claims that we have reasons to perform some action because of the goodness of the pattern consisting of widespread performance of the same type of action in the same type of circumstances. Plausible forms of Rule Consequentialism are also pluralist, in the sense that, alongside pattern-based reasons, they recognise ordinary act-based reasons, based on the goodness of individual actions. However, Rule Consequentialist theories are distinguished from other pluralist theories of pattern-based reasons by implausible claims about the relative importance of act-based and pattern-based reasons in different cases. Rule Consequentialists should give up these claims. They should either embrace some other pluralist pattern-based view, or reject pattern-based reasons altogether. Note, though, that these arguments apply only to compliance-based, rather than acceptance-based, versions of Rule Consequentialism. This suggests that these two kinds of theory are more different from each other than we might previously have realised.”

- 2022 [104] Woollard, Fiona (2022): Hooker’s Rule-consequentialism, Disasters, Demandingness, and Arbitrary Distinctions, *Ratio* 35, S. 289–300.³⁶
- 2017 [105] Yeo, Shang Long (2017): Measuring the Consequences of Rules: A Reply to Smith, *Utilitas* 29, S. 125–31. – Zu [90].

³⁵ “This paper explores what a Rule Consequentialist of Brad Hooker’s sort can and should say about normative reasons for action. I claim that they can provide a theory of reasons, but that doing so requires distinguishing different roles of rules in the ideal code. Some rules in the ideal code specify reasons, while others perform different functions. The paper also discusses a choice that Rule Consequentialists face about how exactly to specify reasons. It ends by comparing the theory of reasons offered by Rule Consequentialism with the theory offered by Act Consequentialism, noting that Rule Consequentialism seems better able to explain moral constraints.”

³⁶ “According to Brad Hooker’s rule-consequentialism, as well as ordinary moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, killing, and harming others, the optimific code will include an over-riding “prevent disaster clause”. This paper explores two issues related to the disaster clause. The first issue is whether the disaster clause is vague—and whether this is a problem for rule-consequentialism. I argue that on Hooker’s rule-consequentialism, there will be cases where it is indeterminate whether a given outcome counts as a disaster such that it is permissible to infringe a given prohibition to avoid that outcome. I argue that it counts in favour of Hooker’s rule-consequentialism that it makes this space for vagueness. The second issue is how to understand the disaster clause so that it does not make rule-consequentialism intolerably demanding—and more particularly whether avoiding overdemandingness requires the rule-consequentialist to place a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid. I will argue that rule-consequentialism can avoid overdemandingness without placing a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid.”