Literatur zur Konsequentialisierung
Bibliography on consequentializing

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order:
http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bconsequentializing.pdf

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order:
http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/cconsequentializing.pdf


“Consequentialism is an agent-neutral teleological theory, and deontology is an agent-relative non-teleological theory. I argue that a certain hybrid of the two namely, non-egoistic agent-relative teleological ethics (NATE) is quite promising. This hybrid takes what is best from both consequentialism and deontology while leaving behind the problems associated with each. Like consequentialism and unlike deontology, NATE can accommodate the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs. Yet unlike consequentialism and like deontology, NATE accords well with our commonsense moral intuitions.”

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“To consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic statuses of actions and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. I explain the motivation for the consequentializing project and defend it against recent criticisms by Mark Schroeder and others.”
“Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation, agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC against three objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc, (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible to make self-sacrifices that don’t make things worse for others, and (3) that it violates certain axioms of expected utility theory, viz., transitivity and independence.”

“Consequentializers suggest that for all non-consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentialist counterpart that results from absorbing originally non-consequentialist moral intuitions can now no longer explain, in a theoretically illuminating way, why certain actions are wrong and others right.
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Authors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Schroeder, Mark</td>
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The paper explains why traditional consequentialist theories did not embrace the procedure, and sketches how consequentialism can consequentialize without incurring the same cost.”